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Judging and Equality:
For Whom Does the Charter Toll?
A. Wayne MacKay*
1. INTRODUCTION
No man is an Iland, intire of it self; every man is a peece of the Continent, a
part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse,
as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of
thine owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in
mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls
for thee.
-John Donne'
While it may be in questionable taste to begin an article on equal-
ity with a poem that uses "man" in the global sense, John Donne's
* Professor of Law at Dalhousie University, presently engaged in researching and
writing a book on Supreme Court of Canada Judges entitled, Benchmarks. This is
a co-authored work and one of the author's collaborators is Professor McBride,
who authored the preceding article in this volume and made useful comments on
an earlier version of this article. Fellow colleagues at the law school also read ear-
lier drafts of this article and thanks are in order for professors Leon Trakman and
David Fraser. Osgoode Hall law professors Allan Hutchinson, Patrick Monahan
and Andrew Petter were also of assistance by sharing their views on this topic in
both oral and written form. Special acknowledgement is owed to Peter Swan and
Stephen Malikail. The former, a graduate of Dalhousie Law School, provided re-
search on the jurisprudential theories and educated the author about the Critical
Legal Studies Conference. The latter is a third year Dalhousie Law student, who
did research on the early Charter cases and provided a critique on some of the
critics of liberal theory. Finally, a general debt is owed to the members of the
Charterwatch seminar during the 1983-84 and 1984-85 terms who stimulated my
thinking about the role ofjudges and the Charter in promoting social change and
educated the author on the implications of feminist theory for such change.
1 As quoted in E. Hemingway, For Whom The Bell Tolls (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 3.
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words do evoke a sense of community that feminists would applaud.'
The tension between an individualistic and communitarian approach
to the world is crucial to how equality will be defined in Canada.
Violations of equality diminish the rights and dignity of all Canadians
and not just the particular individuals or the specific groups who are
the immediate victims of inequality. This recognition is only the be-
ginning of the complex task of defining equality as guaranteed in sec-
tion 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedms.3 Unravelling the concept
of equality at a theoretical level is the focus of the articles by Peter
Rogers and Colleen Sheppard which follow this one. Defining equal-
ity in specific situations is the thrust of the articles on prostitution,
pornography, homosexuality and pensions for women in the second
part of this volume. My task is to explore the role of judges in prom-
oting equality as a link between the more general comments on judg-
ing by Professor McBride that precede this article and the more direct
treatment of equality in the articles that follow.
It is the relationship between judging and equality that I wish to
explore. In order to pursue this, related questions must also be address-
ed. What are the limits and strengths of the Charter as a means to a
more egalitarian society?4 What is the nature ofjudging and is it dis-
tinct from the larger political process?' What has been the record of
the Supreme Court of Canada to date on Charter issues and how can
this be extrapolated to emerging equality issues?6 What is the proper
2 While I am aware that feminist theory is in its formative stages and is by no
means monolithic, a preference for communitarian values over individualistic
ones does appear to be an important theme. C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Mar-
xism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983), 8 Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture. and Society 635, and Feminism in Canada: From
Pressure to Politics, G. Finn and A. Miles, eds. (Montreal: Black Rose Books,
1982).
3 Part I of the Constitution Aa, 1982, Sched. B. of Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
[Hereafter referred to as the Charter.]
4 Encompassed in this question is the relationship between law and social change.
This issue and the desirability of a rights model as an approach t equality will
be explored in Parts 2 through 4 of this article.
5 This question is addressed by Professor McBride in his article, supra, and will
be more fully explored by W. MacKay, E. McBride, R. Balcome and D. Russell,
Benchmarks (Toronto; Carswell, forthcoming). I shall also return to this question
in Parts 4, 5 and 6 of this article.
6 The Supreme Court of Canada has been selected because of its influence and the
availability of material to assess. I am aware that many Charter issues incuding
those on equality will be resolved outside the courts and those that do go to court
will be resolved at lower judicial levels. Assessing the general judicial response
to the Charter is beyond the scope of this article. The responses of the Supreme
Court are examined in Part 6 of this article.
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role for the courts in promoting equality in comparison with other
institutional mechanisms?
7
These are difficult questions that demand more than a traditional
legalistic analysis. Both the concepts of equality and judging are
grounded in the ideology of the liberal state." Thus I shall consider
the various jurisprudential theories that emerge under the umbrella of
liberalism as well as more radical theories that challenge the basic as-
sumptions of liberalism. Such theories will not be examined in depth
or for their own value, but as a means of casting light on the concepts
ofjudging and equality. Whether they realize it or not, judges are in-
fluenced by theories about the nature and the role of law. These influ-
ences are most often unconscious and few judges would adopt, or
even be able to articulate, a particular judicial philosophy. However,
judges do not exist in a vacuum and they are not immune from juris-
prudential and political theories. To understandjudging requires more
than a functional analysis of the courts as institutions 9 or a series of
judicial biographies.' 0 Judging must be examined in its broader social
and political context. That is the aim of this article.
The importance of theory and ideology in defining equality is
explored elsewhere in this volume, most notably by Peter Rogers and
Colleen Sheppard. If the open-ended concepts enshrined in the Charter
are not anchored in some broader philosophy, the Charter jurispru-
dence will have no coherence at all. Judges need not overtly adopt a
particular philosophy but they should at least be informed about the
jurisprudential and political implications of their decisions. Some un-
derstanding of legal and political theory is essential to an understand-
ing of the Charter as well as the decisions that flow from it." Like
7 I speculate in Parts 3 and 5-7 of this article about what can reasonably be expected
of judges and the Charter in respect to equality. This involves a consideration of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of courts in a liberal-democratic society.
8 The term "liberal" is used throughout this article not as a contrast to "conserva-
tive" in the political sense of those terms, but rather as a broad terra to describe
mainstream political thinking in Canada. Its components will be explored in Part
4 of this article.
9 J. Snell and F. Vaughan, The'Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution
(Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1985) offers an informative and useful history
of an important institution but reveals little about the nature of judging in
Canada.
10 D. Williams, Duff. A Life in the Law (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1984) makes a
significant contribution to Canadian literature but fails to put Duff in his political
context or explore the nature of the judicial role. This view is shared by D. Stan-
ley, in her review of Duff. A Life in the Law in (1985), 9 Dal. L.J. 820.
11 N. Lyon, "The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee:
What to Do with Vague but Meaningful Generalities" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 57.
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judging, the Charter, too, must be placed in its broader political con-
text.
There are important basic questions about whether a rights model
is the best approach to equality. 12 Karl Marx rejected all "rights dis-
course" as inherently individualistic and generally inconsistent with
economic determinism.13 He also argued that law is used to mask basic
economic inequalities. This explains why Marxism has generally ig-
nored law and judging as indistinguishable components of the oppres-
sive capitalist ideology. If a "rights discourse" is accepted as a legiti-
mate way to pursue an egalitarian society, there are still disputes about
how rights should be defined. Most discussions of rights focus on the
individual as the bearer of rights,14 and this evokes a sympathetic re-
sponse from most judges trained in the individualistic common law.
Within these individual rights schools of thought there are differences
about which rights are most fundamental. H.L.A. Hart' s champions
liberty as the most fundamental right, while Dworkin16 advocates
equality as the most basic value.
Whether both equality and liberty can be defined in communita-
rian rather than individualistic terms is an important theme through-
out this article. The traditionally accepted antipathy between liberty
and equality may disappear if both concepts are defined in relation to
collective rather than individual values. 7 Those who support a more
collectivist or communitarian approach to rights come from a variety
of political perspectives, while those who support an individual rights
model normally embrace liberalism. Joseph Raz, for one, questions
the idea that the individual is the ultimate rights bearer and prefers to
12 Some of the limits inherent in a "rights discourse" are explored in Part 4 of this
article. This is really a subset of the limitations of legalism or "law talk" in rela-
tion to basic values disputes.
13 Theories of Rights, J. Waldron, ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), pp.
1-3.
14 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971) and R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977) are two
leading exponents of this school.
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979).
16 Supra, note 14.
17 T. McCormack, "Two (b) or Not Two (b): Feminism and Freedom of Expres-
sion," in Se Connaitre: Politics and Culture in Canada, J. Lennox, ed. (Toronto:
York Univ., Dept. of Communications, 1985) at p. 64 is one example of reading
a traditionally individualistic right in a more collective fashion, in order to make
it more acceptable to women.
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speak of fundamental collective values.' At the other end of the spec-
trum, Marxists, to the extent that they would engage in rights dis-
course at all, would embrace collective rights. Feminists and members
of the Critical Legal Studies Conference would also prefer collective
rights, although there would be disagreement as to which collective
rights should prevail. ,9
Judges will be directly confronted with the problem of deciding
not only which individual rights should prevail when there is a con-
flict, but also when collective rights should be the basis of a decision.
The balance between collective and individual rights is implicit not
just in theory but also in the structure of the Charter itself. There is
thus a meeting of theory and practice in the process of adjudication.
Whether the Charter will promote or stultify equality depends on
many variables. Foremost among these are the nature of the Charter
itself, the limits of the theory and practice of rights in a liberal state
and the potential and limits ofjudging in Canada. These variables will
be considered in turn before speculating about what we can reasonably
expect from judges as promoters of equality in Canadian society. At
this point, judges might conclude that the bell tolls for them.
2. THE PROMISE OF JUDGES AND THE CHARTER
Unless this Court is willing to say that the condition of Duncan's (the
accused) purse is no ground upon which to qualify or limit his rights as
a citizen of the United States . . . then our heritage of constitutional
privileges and immunities is only a promise to the ear to be broken to
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.2
Canada's Charter has real potential in its broad and open-ended
language and invites lawyers and judges to engage in a debate about
basic values in Canadian society. The critical question raised by the
opening quotation is whether the promise of the Charter is only a
"promise to the ear to be broken to the hope." If the Charter creates
an illusion of rights that cannot in fact be enforced, it is a bad thing
for Canadians. Not only will raised expectations be dashed, but the
limited energy for reform will have been diverted from more useful
18 J. Raz, "Right-Based Moralities," in Waldron, supra, note 13 at p. 182.
19 MacKinnon, supra, note 2 and D. Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries" (1979), 28 Buff. L.R. 205, are good examples of the respective views
of the two groups on this issue.
20 Edivards v. People of California, 314 U.S. 164 at 172 (1941), per Jackson J.
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channels. After four years it is far from clear whether the Charter is a
good or bad thing for the real protection of rights in Canada.
Legal academics are divided on the potential of the Charter. There
are the Charter optimists, who, either as a matter of prediction or ad-
vocacy, make broad claims about the Charter as a vehicle for change.
21
Another group of academics might be labelled as the Charter skep-
tics. 22 A third group is the Charter pessimists 33 This latter group views
the Charter as an obstacle to real change in society. If the Charter can
be analogized to a religion, as Professor McBride does in his article,
the optimists are the true believers, the skeptics are the agnostics and
the pessimists are the atheists or heretics. Heretics may be the better
term for the last group as they reject the Charter but embrace other
religions. Practising lawyers and judges would also divide along simi-
lar lines.
21 Examples of people in this category would include the following:
C. Beckton, "Freedom of Expression" in Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms:
Commentary, W. Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 1982),
pp. 75-121;
D. Gibson, "The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982), 12 Man. L.J.
213;
Lyon, supra, note 11;
M. Manning, Rights, Freedomis and the Courts (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery
Ltd., 1983);
W Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights" in Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms: Conmnentary, W. Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, eds. (Toronto: Carswell,
1982), pp. 395-442.
22 Examples of people in this category would include the following:
W. Mackay, "Fairness After the Charter: A Rose By Any Other Name?" (1985),
10 Queen's L.J. 263;
R.A. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude-The Jurisprudence of the Charter:
Eight Theses" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 321;
P. Monahan, "Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review,"
an address delivered at the Legal Theory Workshops, University of Toronto, De-
cember, 1985;
A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter and The Early Charter Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada" (1986), 8 Sup. Ct. L.R. (forthcoming);
R.A. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental Rights" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 755;
J. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the
Charter" (1983), 13 Man. L.J. 425.
23 Many but not all of the people in this category would be people who reject the
basic tenets of liberalism. Two examples of this category are D. Fraser, "Truth
and Hierarchy: Will the Circle Be Unbroken?" (1985), 33 Buff. L.R. 729 and A.
Hutchinson, "High court changes the constitutional game: Will a judicial
whirlwind blow itself right out? Toronto Star, February 8, 1986 and "Charter
Rhetoric avoids real issue: the quality of life," Globe and Mail, May 1, 1984.
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Assessment of the Charter and its implications for change may,
for sake of clarity, be considered at three separate levels:
1. the choice of the rights paradigm as the central means of addressing
the relationships amongst individuals and between individuals and
the state;
2. the judicial treatment of the Charter,
3. the content of the Charter itself.
Most of what follows this part of the article will be concerned with
the first two levels of analysis. This part of the article examines the
Charter as a document. Since the words of the Charter only gain life
from judicial interpretation, it is impossible to totally ignore the sec-
ond level analysis but it will be kept to a minimum. I shall begin by
considering the positive side of the Charter-its potential.
(a) Broad Potential
The Charter contains broad and ringing phrases that invite crea-
tive arguments from lawyers and innovative responses from judges.
While the catalogue of rights and their expression is not ideal, the
wording is broad enough to encompass most of the important value
disputes in Canadian society. Sections 7 and 15 are prime examples.
The former has already been used on both sides of the abortion debate
and in respect to the testing of cruise missiles in Canada. Out of sec-
tion 7 there have also been claims of a right to die, a right to an edu-
cation and a right to basic social security, to name but a few. The
equality guarantees in section 15 offer an even broader scope and the
kind of issues that will arise under it will be discussed in Part 2 of this
article.
Implicit in the Charter is a balancing of interests that moves judges
to a more overt policy-making role. This balancing will involve not
only a weighing of individual rights against societal claims to reason-
able limits in section 1 but also the weighing of one individual right
against another. Often an equality right will be on one side of the
scale and one of the liberty rights on the other. Thus the structure of
the Charter may force judges to be more overtly political than they
have been in the past. Patrick Monahan views this interest balancing
role with some alarm:
Even a cursory analysis of the language and structure of the Charter indi-
cates that most Charter litigation may well turn on the issue of the "wis-
dom" of legislative choices. In part, this is a product of the abstract and
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generalized nature of the rights protected by the Charter. The very process
of defining the content of the rights protected by the Charter seems inhe-
rently political. Many of these rights-most notably the right to "equal-
ity" and "liberty"-contain little or no substantive criteria; they resemble
blank slates on which thejudiciary can scrawl the imagery of their choice.
But there is a second problem. Having given content to these open-ended
rights, the judiciary must then "balance " these rights against considera-
tions of the general welfare under section one. This process of "interest
balancing" seems just another way of asking the fundamental legislative
questions: "is this worth what it costs?" The process of balancing indi-
vidual against collective interests is a calculation which would have al-
ready been made by the legislature when it passed the statute under re-
view. Since the government passed the statute, it must have calculated
that the interests to be served outweigh those to be sacrificed. Section
one of the Charter appears to invite the Court to assess and second-guess
the "wisdom" of the balance struck by the legislature. 4
In response to his concern about courts that may become too ac-
tively involved in assessing the wisdom of government action, Profes-
sor Monahan articulates a theory of judicial review based upon the
promotion of democratic values; these include the rights to participate
in decision-making, equality of access and fair distribution of benefits.
He goes beyond a strict process standard of review but stops short of
having the judges, evaluate outcomes.15 Monahan's touchstone is the
democratic values implicit in Canadian society, which are distinct
from those in the United States. This evolution of a distinct Canadian
jurisprudence is one of the promising features of the Charter.
W.R. Lederman has also fixed his attention on the phrase "free
and democratic society" in section 1 of the Charter, but to a rather
different purpose than that of Monahan. Professor Lederman predicts
that independent courts and democratic legislatures will both pursue
the goals of the Charter in a spirit of partnership. 6 The re-thinking of
24 Monahan, supra, note 22 at p. 12.
25 One of the clearest articulations of process-based review in the United states is
J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrnst: A Theory ofJndicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1980). Monahan's theory ofjudicial review also appears to have been
influenced by Dworkin's views on equality. Dworkin, supra, note 14.
26 W.R. Lederman, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms- One Year
Later" (1983), 21 Trans. Royal Soc. of Can. 81, and "Democratic Parliaments,
Independent Courts and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in The
Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward, J.C. Courtney, ed.
(Calgary: Univ. of Calgary Press, 1985). The latter article is also to be published
in a forthcoming issue of the Queen's L.J.
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the comparative roles of legislators, administrators and courts is
another promising feature of the Charter that is likely to be realized.
Part of the above reconsideration of institutional roles is a concern
about the best way to protect minorities, defined as those who have
been excluded from power; this includes all the groups specified in
section 15 of the Charter and many more as well. Courts may offer
minorities a shield against the majority, and this may be particularly
important in times of political conservatism and economic restraint.
Even those who are Charter skeptics see a useful role for the courts in
relation to minorities.
Nevertheless, we should also see the Charter as a brave and necessary step
in enhancing the civility of the Canadian state. The diversity of Canada
has made it a polity with many minorities, which are everywhere vulner-
able to the passing whims of majorities. Our history is full of instances
where a national majority has imposed its will on local minorities, as in
the imposition of the tariff or conscription in a way that created deeply-
rooted resentments which lasted for generations, or where local
majorities in particular provinces or regions abused the rights of their
own minorities, such as Japanese-Canadians in British Columbia,
Jehovah's Witnesses in Quebec and francophones in Manitoba. The Char-
ter as it stands might not have been strong enough to protect or help
them, but its ultimate object was to .nourish an atmosphere of civility
which will act as a restraint on the old Adam in us all. A truly civil polity
is a very fragile thing, as it is, as Frank Scott said, a work of art that is
never finished. It is very easy to destroy or damage it. It requires restraint
and discipline to preserve it.27
Another promising aspect of the Charter is the opening up of legal
discourse to a wider range of sources and influences. 28 Courts will
have to reconsider what sources to use in resolving a Charter question
and how they can become informed on matters beyond the law. Mr.
Justice Gerald La Forest made the following encouraging statement
about Charter sources before being appointed to the Supreme Court
of Canada and it appears to be a view shared by many of his present
colleagues on the Court:
27 J.R. Mallory, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canadian Democracy,"
an address delivered as The Timlin Lecture at the University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, March 8, 1984, at p. 9.
28 The value of examining political and judicial philosophy has been discussed in
Parts 1 and 4 of this article. Based on the early Charter cases, the Supreme Court
does make extensive use of academic writings about the Charter.
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the Charter forces us to look at questions differently than before. How-
ever clear a statute or its purposes may be, courts will be asked to make
a value judgment about it, a duty that is very different from the tradi-
tional role of the court. This should profoundly affect the sources on
which courts must rely for guidance .... Our courts must be guided by
the felt needs and traditions of our own society. But they will be invalu-
able in raising the issues that must be considered. So often we fail to see
that a course of action may unnecessarily infringe on the rights of. the
individual because we have simply become accustomed to that way of
doing things.
I hope, too, that our search will also lead us to seek light from discip-
lines other than the law, for many of the questions we will have to con-
sider transcend the legal system. Rights continue to emerge from the
human experience.29
Perhaps the greatest potential for the Charter lies in its use outside
the courtrooms, but it has important uses within too. While thejudges
play a crucial role in interpreting the Charter, it is the front-line
lawyers who must take the lead in this new constitutional dance.
Lawyers must be open to representing a wider range of clients and be
prepared to raise innovative arguments, supporting alternative ver-
sions of reality. Judges, particularly those at the lower levels, are likely
to resist such creative advocacy but there will be judges willing to
break new ground. Furthermore, the polycentric nature of issues that
arise under the Charter beg a larger role for intervenors and Brandeis
style briefs in the litigation process. This opening up of the adjudica-
tive process will have a positive effect even beyond Charter cases.
The growing media interest in Charter litigation also invites the
use of the Charter as a political tool. This was high on the agenda of
Operation Dismantle when they challenged the testing of cruise mis-
siles in Canada on the basis of the Charter. Such litigation is expensive
but for the amount of media exposure it may be a bargain. Some
groups, however, cannot afford to litigate even if it offers an opportu-
nity for political education. For such groups, the Charter may be used
as part of the public debate about the issue, which may result in con-
cessions in order to avoid bad press or possible litigation.
Whether Canadians like it or not, courts will become a more
overt political forum under the Charter. As J.R. Mallory observes,
this has been the situation in the United States for many decades:
29 G.V. La Forest, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview"
(1983), 61 Can. Bar. R. 19 at 24.
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The Charter opens up a new avenue-one which has for a long time been
available to interest groups in the United States. Attempts to extend civil
rights to blacks could never succeed as long as there were powerful veto
groups in the Congress which could stop any law on the subject. Accord-
ingly, the strategy of shifting the action to the courts not only prodded
the courts into interpreting the law and the constitution in a more liberal
way, but also created a great deal of publicity which helped to mobilze
public opinion and thus encourage legislative and executive compliance.
In the past there were slight prospects for this strategy to succeed in
Canada. Now that the Charter is part of the constitution we may expect
a substantial number of issue-groups, from environmentalists to pro- and
anti-abortion groups, to fight their battles in the courts, which will
greatly enhance their capacity to mobilize public opinion.30
The new political use of courts is not as novel as many people
suggest. What may be new is the extent to which courts can now
provide a forum for a wider range of political views. If minority in-
terests will have as much chance to state their case in court as large
corporate interests, that would be a promising step towards equality.
I shall explore in the next part of the paper whose voices have been
heard in the courts during the first four years of the Charter.
Some writers would dispute the distinction between the legal and
political uses of the courts."1 As Professor McBride suggests in the
preceding article in this volume, there is politics at some level in all
adjudication. It is really a question of kind and degree. Mark Gold
has argued that judges are advocates in rendering a decision and aware
of the value of rhetorical devices. 32 In some senses, judges are political
actors in the adjudicative process, but they are restrained by training
and institutional structures in ways that distinguish them from naked
legislators. 33 1 shall return to this theme in the concluding part of this
article.
30 Supra, note 27 at p. 8.
31 Members of the Critical Legal Studies Conference would take the view that judg-
ing is an inherently political act. Kennedy, supra, note 19, Fraser, supra, note 23
and Hutchinson, supra, note 23 would be examples. Allan Hutchinson may not
consider himself a member of the Critical Legal Studies Conference, but he ap-
pears to agree on the political nature of judging.
32 M. Gold, "The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court
of Canada" (1985), 7 Sup. Ct. L.R. 455 and "Constitutional Pate: The Rhetoric
of Constitutional Argumentation" (1985), 35 U. of T. L.J. 154.
33 The Patriation Reference is a good illustration of politics in a judicial guise. W.
MacKay, "Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Patriation Re-
ference and Its Implications for the Charter of Rights" (1983), 21 Osg. Hall L.J.
55.
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A final promising feature of the Charter is its value as an educa-
tional tool. The role of the judge as teacher and expositor of the law
was recognized before the Charter.34 As McBride indicates in the pre-
ceding article, this role is extended to broader audiences by the Char-
ter. To a significant extent, the Supreme Court of Canada has become
the leader of a national symposium on fundamental rights and values.
While education in itself offers no panacea, the value of raising a
"rights consciousness" should not be discounted. There is a potential
in the Charter that suggests that it may be more than "a promise to
the ear," but there are also limitations.
(b) Charter Limitations
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 declares that the Charter,
as part of the Canadian Constitution, is the supreme law of the land
and any conflicting policy is void. In spite of this declaration ofjudicial
supremacy, there are limitations in the Charter as a document that
make the label "judicial primacy" more applicable to the Canadian
scene. 35 While some lament the dilution ofjudicial power, others argue
that the "joint primacy" of judicial and legislative institutions is both
desirable and appropriate in the Canadian context.36 Supremacy of par-
liament as inherited from the United Kingdom has been qualified but
not discarded. Whether this is a strength or limitation is a matter of
opinion, but in terms of what judges can do with the Charter it is a
limitation.
The clearest indication that supremacy of parliament is still alive
is section 33 of the Charter. This section allows legislators to over-ride
sections 2 and 7-15 of the Charter for a five-year period, which can
then be renewed. It is significant that both sections 7 and 15, which
are the broadest ones in the Charter with respect to equality, are in-
cluded. Interestingly, section 28, dealing with sex discrimination, is
outside the scope of the over-ride clause. On most important issues
the legislators can still have the final say.
During the patriation process, the Charter sales people (mostly at
the federal level) argued that it would be politically unpopular to use
34 B. Laskin, "The Judge and Due Process" (1972), 5 Man. L.J. 235.
35 H. Brun,"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an Instrument of
Social Development," in The Courts and the Charter, C. Beckton and W. Mackay,
eds. (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 1.
36 Ibid. See also Lederman, supra, note 26.
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section 33 and it would thus have little impact. That has not been the
case. In Quebec, under Ren6 Levesque's Parti Quebecois, every
Quebec statute contained a section 33 over-ride clause. In early 1986,
the province of Saskatchewan became the first province outside of
Quebec to use section 33. It was used in the context of back-to-work
legislation to end rotating strikes by the Saskatchewan Government
Employees Union. These uses were not overwhelmingly unpopular
and other such uses will emerge in the future.
3 7
Section 33 represents a political limit on the use of the Charter
and is a reaffirmation of majority rule. Whatever the courts say about
what rights should be protected in Canadian society, these same rights
can be over-ridden if there is the political will to do so. This has led
some critics of the Charter to question the value of a document that
only protects politically acceptable rights. Dean Rod Macdonald of
McGill Law School is one such critic, and he argues that a proper
analysis of the Charter requires an examination and justification of the
basic tenets of liberal political theory.3 An attempt will be made in
Part 4 of this article to assess the Charter in its legal and political con-
text. Only when painting on this broader canvas will the strengths
and limitations of the Charter appear.
Macdonald asserts that history teaches that charters of rights are
ineffective in intolerant societies and unnecessary in tolerant ones. I
would question the historical accuracy of this generalization, but even
if it is true in most cases, does this undercut the value of the Charter?
Surely there will be a few victories under the Charter that would not
otherwise have occurred, and these will have some effect on unliti-
gated claims and administrative practices. Furthermore, the Charter
itself and the litigation and debate that emerges from it has an educa-
tional component that can change social attitudes about rights.
9
37 A. Petter, "Charter Loophole Imperils Basic Rights," Globe and Mail, February
20, 1986, argued that the over-ride clause might be used to prevent doctors using
the Charter to challenge Ontario's legislation banning extra-billing. While this
use would be unpopular with doctors and some other segments of society, it
would be popular in many quarters. In July, 1986, Nova Scotia's Attorney-Gen-
eral, Ron Giffin, threatened to use section 33 if the courts interpreted the Charter
to include the right for homosexuals to serve in the police forces. Unfortunately,
homosexuals are more likely targets for section 33 than doctors.
38 Macdonald, supra, note 22 at p. 323. Macdonald himself does not attempt to
uncover or justify these basic assumptions but R. Unger, in his Knowledge and
Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975), does attempt to uncover and dissect
the essential components of the liberal state in Chapters 1-3.
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There will be cases where political actors are more progressive
than their judicial counterparts. In such cases, judges may use the
Charter to impede rather than promote change. This is a limitation on
the Charter but not a case for discarding it. When there is no political
will to uphold civil liberties a judicial entrenchment of rights can buf-
fer the effect of this absence. When there is such a political will the
existence of the Charter may expedite the judicial acceptance of a simi-
lar view. The approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to the Charter
in contrast to its approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights offers some
evidence of the value of a Charter as an education for judges. In an
increasingly conservative political climate there is also some solace in
the fact that even a conservative judiciary can hold the fort against an
extreme shift away from human rights.
Many of Macdonald's complaints, and he is typical of many of
the Charter skeptics, are against what judges will do with the Charter
rather than the Charter itself. It is difficult to distinguish judicial in-
terpretation from the words of the Charter as they converge to give
meaning to the guaranteed rights. Whether the Charter should be read
expansively or narrowly depends on assumptions about whether
judges are promoters or inhibitors of rights. I shall return to the role
of judges as protectors of equality in the latter parts of this article.
Section 1 of the Charter is the vehicle by which judges can limit
the rights guaranteed in the document:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
What are the reasonable limits on broad rights such as equality, that
judges will find acceptable? The burden of demonstrable justification
rests with the state but judges will be the final arbiters of what limita-
tions are reasonable in "a free and democratic society." To put the
question in the present context, what reasonable limitations on equal-
ity will be tolerated in Canada, as a free and democratic society?
Judges will claim to reflect broader social values in making such judg-
ment but they will inevitably impose their own values as well. Thus,
the extent to which section 1 limits the impact of the Charter depends
on the value structure implicit in both the judicial and the larger polit-
ical process. These values will be examined later.
A significant limitation on the reach of the Charter is the applica-
tion section 32. The majority view on this section is that the Charter
will encompass legislative and government action, broadly defined,
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but will not be extended to the private sector. 9 There is a minority
view that section 32 can be read to include the private sector and thus
extend the Charter to all activity.40 Many violations of equality do
occur in the private sector, and if it is immune from the Charter, the
Charter will be blunted as an instrument of equality. Hester Lessard's
article in this volume4' emphasizes the negative impact that a state
action interpretation of the Charter would have on combating discrimi-
nation against women. The division of the world into public and pri-
vate spheres has been identified by others as a limitation on legal re-
form generally.
42
Perhaps the most important limitation on the Charter is in the
form of things that were omitted from the document. One such omis-
sion is a guarantee of the funding necessary to pursue a Charter chal-
lenge. This limits the real access to the Charter, as is discussed in the
next part of this article. Limitations are also inherent in the choice of
rights for inclusion in the Charter and the inferential exclusion of
others.
One of the best critiques of the Charter on a philosophical basis
is that presented by Robert Samek.4' He argues that the rights pro-
tected in the Charter are the predictable legal and political rights that
characterize the liberal state. They are aimed at removing the negative
constraint of the state on individual freedom of choice. There is a not-
able absence of social and economic rights that would require a more
positive intervention on the part of the courts.
4
As the title of his article suggests, Professor Samek is concerned
about "untrenching" fundamental rights.45 In his view, real fundamen-
39 K. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in
The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Commentary, W, Tarnopolsky and G.
Beaudoin, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), p. 41.
40 D. Gibson, supra, note 21 and "Distinguishing the Governors from the Gov-
erned" (1983), 13 Man. L.J. 505.
41 H. Lessard, "The Idea of the "Private": A Discussion of State Action Doctrine
and Separate Sphere Ideology," infra.
42 Members of the Critical Legal Studies Conference have been particularly vocal
in attacking the public/private distinction. Their critique is examined in Part 4
of this article. Petter, supra, note 22, argues that democratically elected govern-
ments have been historically more favourable to the disadvantaged than the
courts. Thus, it is odd to see the former as the villains and the latter as the heroes.
43 Samek, supra, note 22.
44 The limits of this selection are also emphasized by Macdonald and Petter, supra,
note 22.
45 Samek, supra, note 22.
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tal rights have a dynamism that denies a specific ideological content
and precludes a static articulation and interpretation by the courts. Fur-
thermore, he argues that most of the rights protected by the Charter
are not fundamental. Samek takes the word "fundamental" in the
term "fundamental rights" very seriously. He states that fundamental
rights are rights that inhere in us qua human beings and not as particip-
ants in a particular political and social mix. Thus, the equality provi-
sion comes closest to capturing what Samek feels is a fundamental
right. Language rights and mobility rights may be rights, but they
are not fundamental rights, in Samek's view. Rights that are funda-
mental do not arise from conferral by the state. Neither can they be
removed by the state. This is clearly a philosopher's objection to the
Charter.
While I am in.general agreement with the Samek critique and
particularly like his link between rights and needs, there are also some
problems with his analysis. Even if rights do inhere in people, the
regulation of their exercise must involve the state. Another
philosopher, Jacques Maritain, has argued that while fundamental
rights are possessed by people and not conferred by the state, their
exercise is a function of being recognized or limited by the state.
46
Petter makes the perceptive comment that the Charter is not a distribu-
tive document but represents a "zero sum" game in which rights are
given to citizens at the expense of governments.
4
1
The argument about what rights should be included in the Charter
presupposes an assumption about the value of courts as protectors of
fundamental rights. Since Samek is opposed to the entrenchment of
fundamental rights, it appears that he is skeptical about the role of
courts as a protector. Thus, one would expect him to be happy with
the fact that social and economic rights, which he regards as real fun-
damental rights, are outside the Charter. This is not the case.4 Indeed,
sections 7 and 15 could be broadly interpreted to encompass social and
economic rights. A more difficult question is whether this would be
a good thing.
When dealing with the issue of entrenchment of economic rights,
Charter critics are as blind and legalistic as the objects of their scorn.
46 J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp.
101-103.
47 Petter, supra, note 22.
48 This same criticism can be made of Mcdonald, supra, note 22, although he may
be more optimistic about the role of courts.
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More would be required than the simple entrenchment of an economic
or social right. Such a move would give the Charter more clout, but
entrenchment is only the legal act. What would this entail in terms of
an egalitarian redistribution of wealth in our society? Would those
from whom this wealth would be taken remain in Canada? Would the
capital flight from a country contemplating such a move result in an
economy that could not maintain its present standards of welfare or
jobs, let alone give effect to the legal right to a job or a guaranteed
minimum income? Failure by legal commentators to recognize and
address such concerns gives real meaning to the term disciplinary
blindness. MacDonald appears blind to this, while Samek says only
that we must be willing to pay the price for economic rights; on what
that price is, he is conspicuously silent. 
49
Is the Charter negative, positive or neutral as a means of promot-
ing equality? The answer to this question has less to do with the docu-
ment itself than how it is used. If the Charter will be used negatively,
then the limitations on it are positive for equality. If the Charter will
be used positively, then the opposite is true. The Charter has the poten-
tial for positive use, although such use is limited. Whether this poten-
tial will be realized depends on the political and judicial context. The
rest of this article turns to these matters.
I have identified myself as a Charter skeptic or agnostic, rather
than a true believer. The basis for my skepticism is not the Charter
document itself but rather the limits that are inherent in the ideology
of the liberal state and the process ofjudging. While the Charter is not
self-enforcing, it offers the potential for significant change. There will
be no revolution in Canadian society and none was intended by its
drafters. The Charter will, however, change the lot of some Canadians.
Whether the protection of fundamental rights will be extended to
those with fundamental needs will be the true test of the Charter.
3. WHOSE INTERESTS WILL BE PROTECTED?
It is too early to properly assess who will be protected by the
Charter in the long run, but I will attempt to take stock of the situation
after four years. The performance of the Supreme Court of Canada
will be reserved for separate treatment in Part 6 of this article. There
has been no systematic analysis of lower court decisions but rather a
49 Macdonald and Samek, supra, note 22.
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selection of some high profile cases that have attracted either scholarly
attention or caught the fancy of the media. This analysis emphasizes
the use of the Charter as a legal tool in courts and does not encompass
its political and educational uses, which are also important. These lat-
ter uses may provide significant protection for groups and individuals
by causing bureaucrats to, be more rights conscious and by producing
changes in administrative policy, as a way of avoiding Charter chal-
lenges. By focusing on court cases, my conclusions in this section
may be more negative than if all elements of Charter impact were as-
sessed. This is particularly true because the political and educational
uses of the Charter are less costly.
Since the spin-off benefits of the Charter will not be assessed in
this article, the question could more accurately be stated as-who will
benefit from the Charter in the courts? This question has at least two
components:
1. what voices will be heard in Charter cases? and
2. what interests will prevail?
Both components involve the institutional and human limitations of
the courts and liberal democracy, which will be discussed in more
detail later.
(a) Access Problems
There are critical problems of economic access to the courts to
raise a Charter challenge. To raise an important Charter issue, litigants
must be willing to fight their case all the way to the Supreme Court
of Canada. This is a costly endeavour and weights the scales ofjustice
on the side of the wealthy litigant. As a result, most of the early Su-
preme Court of Canada cases, outside the criminal law area, have been
pursued by companies or economically comfortable individuals. Pro-
fessor Petter suggests that the economic profile of these litigants af-
fects not just whose voices are heard, but also the way that the rights
are ultimately interpreted.'s These economic limitations, inherent in a
judicially enforced Charter, represent structural defects that severely
limit Charter protection.
One way to diminish the financial obstacles to litigation is to en-
courage class actions. This would be a break with the Canadian trad-
50 Petter, supra, ndte 22.
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ition.s  Another way is to allow easy access to intervenor groups in
Charter cases. Once again, this has not been the Canadian pattern, and
the granting of intervenor status is a matter ofjudicial discretion. Ac-
cording to Kenneth Swan, Chairman of the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, even the Supreme Court of Canada has been reluctant to
allow groups to intervene in Charter cases."s Even ifjudges were more
generous in granting intervention status, there are not as many Cana-
dian groups aimed at the promotion of human rights as exist in the
United States. Those groups that do exist are not as well funded and
have less experience than their American counterparts. Unfortunately,
those who are most in need of equality rights will be least capable of
claiming them in courts, either as individuals or as members of public
interest groups.
S3
Corporate interests have made their voices heard in the early
Charter cases. This has led some commentators to conclude that
businesses will be the major beneficiaries of the Charter.4 Not only
can they afford the high costs of litigation, they can also deduct their
court expenses for tax purposes. It does not automatically follow that
business interests are served, from the fact that their voices are heard
frequently. Private individuals can benefit from rights won by com-
panies. There is an element of truth in that, but hopes should not be
pinned on a trickle-down theory.
(b) Early Charter Approaches
To assess who is likely to win these early Charter battles, I shall
consider the approach and attitude ofjudges on rights issues. On the
crucial question of sources, judges have not been very adventurous in
the early Charter cases. There has not been extensive use of empirical
data or other extrinsic aids. A common practice has been to look to
history to see what rights are fundamental. This is an approach
51 J. Bankier, "Class Actions for Monetary Relief in Canada: Formalism or Func-
tion" (1984), 4 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 229.
52 K. Makin, "Brief Assails Move by Court to Curtail Intervenor Status," Globe
and Mail, March 3, 1986.
53 Women may be an exception to this generalization as they have been -n effective
political lobby and have set up a Legal Education Assistance Fund (L.E.A.F.).
Handicapped groups have also developed advocacy groups, but they are not as
well funded.
54 L. McQuaig, "Business may benefit most from Charter of Rights," Globe and
Mail, January 5, 1985.
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guaranteed to promote traditional values and support the status quo.5 s
It is an approach, that has been approved by some academics s6 and
adopted to resolve difficult value issues such as abortion. Parker C.J.,
in R. v. Morgentaler,s7 made the following statement before concluding
that the right to marry and have children is a fundamental value, while
the right to have an abortion is not:
In my opinion, a determination of rights encompassed by s. 7 should
begin by an inquiry into the legal rights Canadians have at common law
or by statute. If the claimed right is not protected by our system of posi-
tive law, the inquiry should then consider if it is so "deeply rooted in the
conscience and traditions of our country as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal" .... "I
The above approach has been followed in a number of cases and
is just as likely to be used in telation to section 15 as to section 7. A
similar static approach can be seen in the early analysis of section 1
by the courts. Here the touchstones are both historical and compara-
tive. If a particular limitation on rights has been around for a long
time and used in several different countries, then it must be reasona-
ble. As Professor Monahan indicates, such an approach confuses the
descriptive with the normative.5 9 Judges should be concerned with
what limits ought to be regarded as reasonable and not with what ones
have been in historical and comparative terms.60 While the historical
and comparative information is useful, to allow it to be determinative
is a sure way of perpetuating the status quo. Change will come not
from examining the past but considering present evidence on patterns
of discrimination and standards of reasonableness.
As important as the judges' approach to the Charter is their views
on the nature of rights. The kinds of rights judges read into the Charter
55 MacKay, supra, note 22 at p. 329.
56 L. Tremblay, "Section 7 of the Charter: Substantive Due Process?" (1984), 18
U.B.C. Law R. 201, and A. Roman, "The Charter of Rights: Renewing the So-
cial Contract" (1982-83), 8 Queen's L.J. 188, are two examples.
57 (1984), 11 C.R.R. 116, 47 O.R. (2d) 353, 41 C.R. (3d) 193, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 258,
12 D.L.R. (4th) 502 (Ont. H.C.).
58 Ibid., p. 171 (C.R.R.).
59 Monahan, supra, note 22 at pp. 14-16.
60 Ibid., at p. 15. Monahan cites as an example of the need to look beyond history
to the empirical evidence of discrimination the desegregation cases in the United
States.
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will determine who is protected. By training and inclination judges
are disposed towards an individualistic rather than collective approach
to rights. This disposition will be accentuated by reference to the
American Bill of Rights experience, which emphasizes individual
rights rather than collective ones. The Charter itself has many indi-
vidual rights guarantees that would fit the classic American mould.
Judges are inclined to view the individual as an atomistic rights bearer,
and this affects how the Charter will be interpreted.
Canada does, however, have a collective rights tradition. Under
the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the B.N.A. Act), the only guaran-
teed rights were collective in nature-language and denominational
schools rights. Furthermore, nearly one third of the rights guaranteed
in the Charter could be characterized as collective.6 If majorities can
be considered a collective, then even section 1 of the Charter may be
viewed as a collective rather than individual guarantee. Sections 7 and
15 can also be interpreted as a protection of group rights, as well as
individual rights. Indeed, these collective rights elements of the Cana-
dian tradition have been cited as a reason why Canada should be care-
ful in adopting American solutions to Canadian problems. 2
Joseph Magnet agrees that it is the bi-cultural and multi-cultural
aspects of Canada that make her unique, and distinguish her from the
United States. 63 He fears, however, that the courts have embarked on
the American road to individualistic rights, to the detriment of more
traditional communitarian values. Professor Magnet extends this in-
dictment to the Supreme Court of Canada as well as the lowei courts.
In respect to the Supreme Court, he may have been premature because
it has not had time to deal with the equality rights, which offer the
greatest potential for a collective interpretation. The criminal law
rights are by their nature individualistic and have consumed much of
the Court's time to date. Nonetheless, there is some support for Mag-
net's concerns in the early judicial performance concerning section 7
of the Charter.
61 Sections 16-23, 25, 27 and 29 are examples.
62 Monahan, supra, note 22.
63 J. Magnet, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter of Rights," an ad-
dress delivered at a symposium on the Supreme Court of Canada at Ottawa,
October 3-5, 1985. The proceedings of this conference are to be published. The
significance of collective rights in the Canadian context is also explored by J.
Woehrling in "Minority Cultural and Linguistic Rights and Equality Rights in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1985), 31 McGill L.J. 50.
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If equality is the likely foundation for a collective rights model,
then liberty would be the basis of an individualistic model. One prob-
lem with a judicial emphasis on liberty is that it tends to work to the
advantage of those who already have it, rather than those seeking to
attain it. It also assumes a certain freedom of choice and action that
is not the normal experience for members of groups who have been
the victims of systemic discrimination. The doctors protesting On-
tario's legislation banning extra-billing are a vivid illustration of the
likely beneficiaries of a broad liberty approach to the Charter.64 Free-
dom to earn money even at the expense of providing unequal medical
services is hardly the basis for an egalitarian revolution.
In Weinstein v. Minister of Education for British Columbia,6s the fol-
lowing broad definition of liberty was adopted from Meyer v. Neb-
raska:
66
[w]hile this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of
the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the indi-
vidual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 67
In R. v. Robson,6" liberty was defined as "so grand a concept,
[that] it may not be possible to capture its meaning in words." This
statement was adopted in Re Mia and Medical Services Commission of
B.C.,69 where a doctor's right to earn a livelihood was anchored in
section 7. Recognizing that such an economic extension of section 7
went beyond American interpretations of liberty, the judge resorted
to the common law heritage:
I am aware that, generally speaking, American courts have been re-
luctant to interfere in the legislative settlement of economic problems. I
64 L. Newberry, "Doctor's civil liberties violated medical association lawyer says,"
Toronto Star, February 13, 1986.
65 [1985] 5 W.W.R. 724, 65 B.C.L.R. 46, 20 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (B.C.S.C.).
66 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
67 Ibid., as cited in Weinstein, supra, note 65 at p. 619 (D.L.R.).
68 (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 727 at 732 (B.C.S.C.).
69 (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 265, 61 B.C.L.R. 273, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (B.C.S.C.).
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accept that as a general rule, but I am not concerned with duly enacted
legislation in this case, and even if I were, there are some rights enjoyed
by our people including the right to work or practice a profession that
are so fundamental that they must be protected even if they include an
economic element.
At the very least, liberty must include those freedoms of lawful con-
duct always enjoyed by Canadian and by our predecessors in the Anglo-
Saxon heritage. If we have enjoyed a right for many centuries then it
must surely be included in "liberty" whether specifically stated in the
Charter or not.
Rights we have enjoyed for centuries include the right to pursue a
calling or profession for which we are qualified, and to move freely
throughout the realm for that purpose. These are rights our people have
always taken for granted. Who would question them until now?0
Another use of a section 7 liberty argument occurred in D & H
Holdings Ltd. v. City of Vancouver.7 Here protection was extended to
the right to operate a hotel and not have a licence arbitrarily removed.
An argument that there was also a violation of equality was rejected.
It is noteworthy that all these cases emanate from the British Colum-
bia Supreme Court and might be regarded as a west coast aberration.
However, other cases have adopted a similar property orientation to
section 7.72 Some cases have taken a more circumspect approach to
section 7, but such rulings have often come when the litigants were
less well established.
It is difficult to identify the likely Charter victors without a more
exhaustive analysis of the cases. The likely losers in Charter litigation
are easier to identify. One of the likely losers is labour unions. Since
70 Ibid. at p. 412 (D.L.R.). It should be noted that another series of cases has refused
to extend section 7 of the Charter to economic and commercial interests: R. v.
Videoflicks (1985), 48 O.R. (2d) 395, 15 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 5 O.A.C. 1, 9 C.R.R.
193, 34 R.P.R. 97, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. C.A.); Gershman v. Motor Transport
Bd., [1985] 2 W.W.R. 63, 31 M.V.R. 67, 10 Admin. L.R. 253, 14 D.L.R. (4th)
722, 32 Man. R. (2d) 308, 15 C.R.R. 68 (Man. Q.B.), affirmed [1986] 1 W.W.R.
303, 16 Admin. L.R. 1, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 520, 36 Man. R. (2d) 81, 17 C.R.R. 132
(Man. C.A.); and Sebastian v. Saskatchewan Securities Com. (1984), 39 Sask. R.
252 (Sask. Q.B.).
71 (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 209, 64 B.C.L.R. 102, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 230 (B.C.S.C.).
72 R. v. Fisherman's Wharf Ltd. (1982), 40 N.B.R. (2d) 42, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 307
(N.B.Q.B.), affirmed on other grounds (1982), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 201, 144 D.L.R.
(3d) 21 (N.B.C.A.), read- property rights into the phrase "security of the per-
son". This approach was rejected in Nova Scotia: Re Workers' Compensation Board
ofNova Scotia and Coastal Rentals Sales & Services Ltd. (1983), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 564
(N.S.T.D.).
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union power is based upon collective rather than individual rights, the
courts' apparent preference for the latter, coupled with their traditional
antipathy to labour, is an ominous combination.7 3 Labour unions have
lost most of their Charter challenges in the lower courts, and there are
a host of cases in the Supreme Court of Canada that will provide a
signal as to whether the Court will be collective or individualistic in
its approach. Some American commentators would suggest that the
Charter will be a regressive step for the labour movement.7 4 This is a
view shared by many Canadian labour lawyers, who see more gains
for employers than workers.
Claims for funds to finance experts in a utility hearing were un-
successful when raised by a group of seniors.75 An argument that the
removal of social assistance payments was in violation of fundamental
justice was summarily dismissed. 76 A single father's claim to family
assistance -was successful in Nova Scotia but the result was a threat by
the government to discontinue such payments to all single mothers,
rather than pay fathers. 7 Everyone loses in such a case, especially the
children of single parent families. Even claims by fathers to have an
equal claim to the custody of their children on divorce have been at-
tacked as denying legitimate claims by mothers who have been given
custody on the basis of merit and not discrimination.7 ' Even the equal-
ity provisions may be used to the advantage of the dominant male
society rather than women or children.
(c) Emerging Equality Issues
The early record of the Charter as a judicial tool for the disadvan-
73 L. Slotnick, "Charter cases major challenge facing unions," Globe and Mail, Jan-
uary 13, 1986.
74 K. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941" (1974), 64 Minn. L.R. 265.
75 Manitoba Society of Seniors Inc. v. Greater Winnipeg Gas Co. (1982), 18 Man. R.
(2d) 440 (Man. C.A.).
76 Elliot v. Director of Social Services (1982), 17 Man. R. (2d) 350 (Man. C.A.),
granted leave. The case was quickly dismissed on the merits, December 1, 1982
(Man. C.A.).
77 Philips v. Lynch, Brown, Parsons et al., unreported, February 27, 1986 (N.S.S.C.).
The government threat was delayed by a stay of proceeding, pending an appeal
of the case.
78 M. Landsberg, "Only in male justice system does primary care count so little,"
Globe and Mail, March 15, 1986.
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taged is not encouraging. While some cases do vindicate the rights of
the dispossessed, they appear to be the exception rather than the
norm.7 9 What does this tell us about who will be the likely victors of
the early equality battles? How will the courts deal with equality issues
that often pit egalitarian values against more traditional claims to lib-
erty? The American experience is not encouraging, as the Bill of
Rights has not been a sharp tool in slicing a path through discrimina-
tion. Ironically, some American lawyers are now attempting to avoid
the Constitution in advancing equality claims in favour of relying on
the better protections of British common law.8 0
Section 1 of the Charter sets the tone for the document by balanc-
ing rights and limits in a free and democratic society. While the precise
elements of a free and democratic society have not been defined, it is
clear that the drafters of the Charter considered Canada to be one. In
relative terms, Canada is free and democratic, although it is far from
perfect on either score. In respect to equality, the question is whether
equality is part of this free and democratic tradition. Freedom for doc-
tors to extra-bill patients may result in a denial of equal access to med-
ical services for the poor. Democracy, in its majoritarian form, may
mean the suppression of the rights of minority groups. Will affirma-
tive action programs become an accepted part of Canada society, in
spite of the fact that they have not been accepted in other countries?
What impact the Charter will have on the promotion of equality
largely depends on the limits of political theory and judging to be
considered in the next parts of this article. The likely judicial approach
to spedfic equality issues, such as sexual discrimination, prostitution,
pornography and homosexuality, are considered later in this volume.
In this part, I shall explore possible judicial responses to equality issues
by three brief case studies.
(i) Abortion
The abortion issue represents one of the great value dilemmas of
79 One obvious area where the disadvantaged have benefited from the Charter is in
the area of criminal law. Even here, the extent to which the Charter can be used
depends upon the resources of the accused. The rights of the accused are indi-
vidualistic in nature and are thus less jarring to judicial philosophy.
80 R. Dworkin, "A New Route To Equality" (1986), Atlantic Monthly, March. This
argument is explored in a book review of C. Haar and D. Fessler, The Wrong
Side of the Tracks (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
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our time. It has been vigourously debated in the legislative arenas and
the press, and this will continue in the courts. Abortion is a complex
issue that cannot be analyzed on the basis of a liberty and equality
dichotomy. In some respects, it is the pro abortion women who come
closest to a classic free choice argument. It is instructive that both the
pro life and pro choice sides of the debate have relied on the guarantees
of section 7 and both will draw upon the equality provision.
What are judges likely to do with the issue? In the past, courts
have been content to leave the basic value choice in the hands of the
legislators. The late ChiefJustice Laskin refused to review the abortion
laws, with respect to the claim that they were unequally administered
in different provinces and in different hospitals within a province.81
He was also concerned about reaching for equality by judicially un-
managable standards, which had no anchor in the legislation. Laskin
thus rejected a substantive due process attack on abortion.
Whether Laskin would have felt as constrained under the Charter
as he did under the Canadian Bill ofRights is a question that will never
be answered. The restrained judicial approach to abortion, charted by
the late ChiefJustice, was adopted by both courts in the post- Charter
Morgentaler litigation. 82 Such a restrictive analysis would preclude the
protection of equality guarantees in the administration of the laws.
This would stunt the evolution of section 15 and is surely wrong.
While I do not think Laskin would support such an interpretation
of his words, there is evidence that he wished to keep the abortion
issue out of the courts.8 3 This does not reflect any particular view on
abortion but rather a desire to have the issue aired in the proper forum.
If the issue cannot be avoided by diverting attention to the issue of
who should decide, the courts are likely to adopt another classic liberal
approach-the process model. The role of the courts would be to pro-
vide a fair process, to which all have access, but leave the substantive
81 R. v. Morgentaler (1975), 4 N.R. 277 (S.C.C.).
82 R. v. Morgentaler (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 353 at 392, 41 C.R. (3d) 193, 14 C.C.C.
(3d) 258, 12 D.L.R. (4th) 502, 11 C.R.R. 116 (Ont. H.C.), appeal quashed (1984),
48 O.R. (2d) 519, 41 C.R. (3d) 362, 16 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 6 O.A.C. 53, 14 D.L.R.
(4th) 184, 14 C.R.R. 107 (Ont. C.A.). See also R. v. Morgentaler (1985), 52 O.R.
(2d) 353, 48 C.R. (3d) 1 at 49, 11 O.A.C. 81, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 22 D.L.R.
(4th) 641, 17 C.R.R. 223 (Ont. C.A.).
83 Minister ofJustice of Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575, [19821 1 W.W.R. 97,
24 C.R. (3d) 352, 24 C.P.C. 62, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 588, 39 N.R. 331, 12 Sask. R.
420, 64 C.C.C. (2d) 97 (S.C.C.). Laskin's denial of standing is puzzling in light
of his earlier expansive approach to the issue.
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value choices to others.8 4 This approach may be indicative of what we
can expect from judges on equality issues in a liberal state.
(ii) Mandatory Retirement
It is likely that the age discrimination provisions of the Charter
will sound the death knell for mandatory retirement in many sectors
of the work force. The Supreme Court of Canada has given a preview
of its view on this issue in relation to a provincial human rights statute.
In Winnipeg School Division No. I v. Craton,"5 the Court elevated
human rights codes above regular statutes and by so doing indicated
a preference for individual human rights over broader social policies.
The result of the case is not surprising, but what is surprising is that
many people (lawyers included) assume that mandatory retirement
can no longer be defended.
The Charter does not mandate the removal of mandatory retire-
ment in all sectors of the work force. It is open to either employers
or unions to mount innovative section 1 arguments supporting man-
datory retirement as a reasonable limitation on equality. In making
such an assessment, courts should examine the effects of removing
mandatory retirement and replacing it with competence tests or allow-
ing people to work indefinitely. This is an ideal issue for the courts
to make a ruling on the basis of empirical evidence rather than arid
legalism. Such an approach requires judicial innovation.
It is interesting to note that those who benefited from the removal
of mandatory retirement are white collar workers, such as teachers
and university professors who are pursuing their own individual
rights. Those who are opposed to its removal are blue collar workers,
whether unionized or not, who are more concerned about their collec-
tive rights. Mandatory retirement is not a pressing issue if you are a
Cape Breton miner exposed to black lung disease on a daily basis.
Another possible loser in a sweeping removal of mandatory retirement
are the consumers of the services of these white collar workers. If
competence tests are introduced to replace the arbitrary age cut off,
they will bring their own problems. Even mandatory retirement is a
complex issue that cannot be solved by a knee-jerk individual rights
approach.
84 S. Fairley, in "Enforcing The Charter: Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and
Just Standard for Judicial Review" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 217, applauds this
process approach.
85 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150, [1985] 6 W.WR. 166, 15 Admin. L.R. 177, 61 N.R. 241
(S.C.C.).
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(iii) Equal Pay For Work of Equal Value
This is a complex, subjective and highly controversial issue.
Courts will look to the experiences of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission on this issue but it has not provided neat solutions or
avoided controversy. Indeed, the issues of equal pay for women and
affirmative action programs have raised the ire of some employers and
led Geoffrey Hale, of the Canadian Organization of Small Businesses,
to compare the activities of human rights workers to "McCarthyism
and the Spanish Inquisition.8 6 While most employers would be more
reserved, there are significant differences in viewpoints about what
constitutes equity in the work place.
Whatjobs are of equal value? Are day care workers more valuable
than judges? Do legal secretaries deserve the same or higher financial
rewards than the lawyers for whom they work? It is not too difficult
to predict the judicial response to the latter two questions. Whether
judges will use section 15 to get into this kind of issue at all is the
bigger question. The kind of conclusion that judges would reach both
about hearing the issues and making the ultimate value choices would
be conditioned by their world view. This leads us to the task of putting
the Charter in its political and judicial context.
4. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
IN A LIBERAL STATE
The highly politicized nature of the section one inquiry is merely exacer-
bated by the reference to "reasonable limits" that can be "demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society". In order to give content to
this terminology, the courts will have to devise some normative theory
about the nature of freedom and of democracy. The trouble with this is
twofold. First, there is no fixed or uncontroversial "core meaning" to
these concepts; they are "contested concepts", with a rich and sophisti-
cated debate continuing within political theory over their content and
application. Second, the judiciary is largely unaware of the nature and
subtlety of these theoretical debates; legal training in Canada has always
relegated such "political" questions to the domain of the academy or the
86 G. Hale made his remarks at a conference entitled-The Impact of the Charter of
Rights and Human Rights Laws on Human Resource Management, held at St. Mary's
University in Halifax, February 27-28, 1986. His remarks were reported in C.
Mcllveen, "Affirmative action program attacked," Halifax Mail Star, February
27, 1986 and "Hale blasts rights workers," Halifax Mail Star, March 1, 1986.
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legislature rather than the courtroom. The enactment of the Charter is
like an unscheduled "night drop", in which Canada's judges and lawyers
have been parachuted unawares into the battlefield of political theory,
without weapons, and with no knowledge of the deployment of the con-
tending armies.17 [footnotes omitted]
What Monahan states about judicial interpretation of section 1 is
true of the Charter generally. Everyone would not agree that what
lawyers and judges need to make -sense of the open-ended language
of the Charter is a theoretical framework."' Even among academics
there are those who assert that the only useful guide to action is prac-
tice and that theorizing is counter productive.8 9 I do not accept the
clear division between theory and practice, but I agree that lawyers
and judges dealing with the Charter can benefit from a broader polit-
ical and legal perspective into which individual cases may be fitted.
The various legal and political categories discussed in this part of
the article need not be adopted by either lawyers or judges. Labels are
by definition restricting and they distort the true situation. Nonethe-
less, a certain amount of categorizing is necessary to make sense of
reality. So long as one remembers that these categories are for conveni-
ence and not intended as a series of procrustean beds, they can serve
a useful purpose. At a minimum, this part should provide a glimpse
of the diversity of perspectives that can be brought to disputes about
rights. It is also important that the key actors in this new Charter
drama identify their own inclinations and biases because they will be
influenced by these larger political trends, whether they realize it or
not. Judges might even be willing to state their views in a more forth-
right fashion than has been the Canadian tradition.
There are other pragmatic benefits to an awareness ofjudicial and
political theory. A recognition of the diversity of views about rights
could lead judges to be more open to a variety of voices in the courts.
This could have practical application to questions of standing and in-
tervenor status. A broader philosophical framework might allow
judges to present a more coherent pattern in Charter cases. 90 A greater
87 Monahan, supra, note 22 at p. 14.
88 The need for theory has been asserted by many other legal academics. Lyon,
supra, note 11 and Roman, supra, note 56 are two examples.
89 S. Knapp and W. Michaels, "Against Theory" (1982), 8 Critical Inquiry 723.
90 Whether one thinks this is possible depends on the theory adopted. Marxists and
feminists would say there is a pattern, but it is a negative one. Critical Legal
Studies scholars would question whether any coherence is possible in existing
law.
64 CHARTERWATCH: REFLECTIONS ON EQUALITY
knowledge of varying perspectives on law could also affect the kinds
of sources that would be tendered by lawyers and accepted by judges.
Formalist judges would focus on the strict construction and analysis
of legal materials, while functionalist judges would be more receptive
to an evaluation of social fact data. A feminist judge might not only
consult new sources, but might also adopt a different method of dis-
pute resolution. Some theory is necessary to assess the proper role of
the judge, unless we are willing to simply trust judges to do "good"
in the individual case in accordance with their own values. To a large
extent that is what presently occurs, but we assume that the individual
choice of the judge is in some way limited by concepts, such as demo-
cracy and the rule of law.9'
(a) Structure and Terminology
In presenting this part of the article there is a danger of falling
victim to the formalism and categorizing that I condemn. With that
in mind, I have attempted to simplify the terminology and structure,
and apply it to judging and the Charter. This part is organized on two
axes-one political and one judicial. For the latter I choose the term
judicial rather than legal because it highlights judging, which is the
focus of this article. Of course, a discussion of broader legal theory
cannot be avoided, but it is considered within a more specific judicial
framework.
(i) The Political Axis: Liberalism and Radicalism
Assuming that Canada has moved beyond the divine right of
kings, a feudal structure of obligations and duties and conservative
theories of enlightened despotism, I label mainstream political
thought as liberalism.92 Included in this term is both conservatism and
liberalism in the more traditional political sense. Liberalism as an
ideology is based on the maximization of freedom of choice in all
spheres of human endeavour. In political terms, this means an em-
phasis on the role of the individual in society and a championing of
his or her free and democratic rights. In economic terms, liberalism
91 Both these concepts are embodied in the Charter-the latter in the preamble and
the former in specific rights.
92 I recognize that elements of all these older political theories are present in
liberalism but they have been subsumed by the latter.
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translates into laissez-faire economics and the glorification of free
choice in the market place. There is also a legal component to
liberalism represented by the rule of law and an emphasis on process
values.
The role of the state as a liberal structure--whether in its political
or judicial guise-is to provide an open process for the resolution of
value disputes. In political terms, this means an emphasis on democ-
racy, which in theory will produce representatives of a host of differ-
ent perspectives and values. In the judicial arena, the emphasis is on
value-neutral judges who will adjudicate upon the competing versions
of reality presented by opposing counsel. Needless to say, this is the
ideal and not the reality. Perhaps it is the ideal version that Macdonald
has in mind when he refers to the "true Canadian liberal--denocratic
tradition" that the Charter should promote.
3
An essential ingredient of liberalism is the silence of the state on
what constitutes the "good". This good is to be defined and pursued
on an individual basis as much as possible; and the state should only
intervene where one individual's pursuit of happiness interferes with
that of another. Such interference is a common occurrence, necessitat-
ing much more state intervention than would fit the ideal. An ideali-
zation of liberty and the pursuit of freedom are vital elements of liberal
doctrine. There are, however, two kinds of freedom-positive and
negative. 4 Negative freedom is concerned with preserving as wide a
sphere of individual autonomy as is consistent with the general public
welfare. Positive freedom is a more spiritual concept aimed at creating
an order in society that will allow the self-actualization of every per-
son. This positive approach may require state intervention on behalf
of more disadvantaged individuals.
In the actual liberal state there are aspects of both variations of
liberty, but it is most prevalent in its negative form. Within the Char-
ter, the majority of guarantees would be interpreted as promoting free-
dom in the negative sense, but some of the collective rights mentioned
earlier and sections 7 and 15 are open to a positive freedom interpreta-
tion. In some instances, such a positive interpretation would be the
only way that the Charter could be used to produce fairness and equal-
ity. However, the key to liberal theory is freedom in the negative
93 Macdonald, supra, note 22. He does not suggest how the "truth" of a particular
tradition is to be assessed. Fraser, supra, note 23, criticizes such assertions of
truth.
94 I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).
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sense. Accordingly, freedom in the form of individual autonomy is
likely to prevail over broader egalitarian or community values. 95
The legal form of liberalism emphasizes the same kind of value
neutrality as the political variant. The rule of law is the credo, and
value-neutral judges are to preside over the interpretation of the law.
A process oriented view calls for a restrictive form ofjudicial review
in which judges promote fair procedures and full participation in the
resolution of value disputes but do not impose substantive values.
96
Judges should only intervene in a substantive way when the democra-
tic and political structures have gone seriously off-track. This raises
another aspect of liberal legalism-a focus on institutions and a con-
cern about who should decide. What actually is decided is less impor-
tant than the process of decision-making. Some Canadian academics
have called for such a process approach to the Charter.9
There have been many critics of liberalism both on the left and
the right of the political spectrum. Most of these criticisms come from
the Critical Legal Studies Conference (hereafter C.L.S.) and will be
examined shortly as part of the radical critique of liberalism. Before
turning to the radical end of my political axis, I shall give one example
of an attack on liberalism from the right.
Ours, the liberal credo tells us, is an "open society" the rules of which
call for a continuing (NEVER terminal) hearing for all ideas . . .for the
reasons that are so often given by liberals themselves, that the ventilation
of differing opinions can do much to drain misunderstanding, to make
for progress, and harmony. The liberal ideology is putatively based on
the maxmization of choice at every level. What is important to the liberal,
95 Pornography is one area where individual rights to expression may prevail over
broader egalitarian claims on behalf of women. Disputes about whether emis-
saries of South Africa should be allowed to defend apartheid in public forums
raise a similar dilemma. An Ontario Supreme Court Judge rejected an injunction
application from four University of Toronto professors seeking to prevent South
African ambassador, Glen Babb, from speaking on campus: "Judge sides with
South African envoy," Ottawa Citizen, January 31, 1986.
96 Ely, supra, note 25, articulates this view in the American context. He develops
his theory in the context of abortion in "The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment
on Roe v. Wade" (1973), 82 Yale L.J. 920.
97 Fairley, supra, note 84, expressly adopts the Ely, supra, note 96, process model.
Monahan, supra, note 22, extends it and MacKay, supra, note 22, supports a pro-
cedural approach by the courts, in respect to section 7, but stops short of a full
process model.
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again putatively, is that there be choice .... The liberal ideology cannot
develop beyond its present point so long as its root delusion is that
method is substance.9
The radical pole of my political axis will not be explored in the same
depth as liberalism, as it is the latter that sets the political context for
the Charter and judging. A more detailed analysis of the radical posi-
tion will be considered in the context of a later section on the critique
of liberalism. Marxism is obviously a radical political view that rejects
the liberal orthodoxy. Since Marxists have little to say about law or
judging, I shall comment on two other radical perspectives-C.L.S.
and feminism. Indeed there are Marxist variants of both C.L.S. and
feminism. Both groups also have non-Marxist strands. I describe
these groups as radical not in a pejorative but in a descriptive sense.
They offer a challenge to mainstream political and legal thought.
What sets these radical political schools apart from mainstream
political thought is a rejection of the basic tenets of liberalism. Tradi-
tional hierarchy is refuted and the role of law and judges in society is
downplayed. Indeed, law, in its present guise, is seen as an oppressor
rather than a liberator of people. Both the C.L.S. school of thought
and the feminist one abandon the liberal idea of value neutrality and
do not apologize for trying to impose their values on others. These
groups are willing to declare a political agenda and pursue it in an
up-front fashion. Rather than focus on the individual as the atomistic
rights bearer, both C.L.S. members and feminists emphasize collec-
tive and communitarian values. Law is seen as part of the larger polit-
ical process, with little or no, autonomous identity. Although there are
parallels, there are also differences between members of C.L.S. and
feminists, and these will be considered in a later section.
(ii) The Judicial Axis: Formalism and Functionalism
Rather than attempt a series of potted summaries of various
schools ofjurisprudence, for which I am ill equipped, I have attempt-
ed to organize brief comments on the leading theories in relation to
two broad judicial theories-formalism and functionalism. The two
categories are fairly distinct, but the theories discussed under them
will sometimes fall into both categories. Functionalism, in particular,
98 W.F. Buckley, Jr., Up From Liberalism, 25th Anniv. ed. (NewYork: Stein and Day
Publishers, 1984), pp. 183--84.
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is an open-ended category embracing many different political and
legal perspectives. My divisions may be more a matter of convenience
than logic. There is no claim to a comprehensive survey of legal
theories.
Accepting that there is no clear line between law and politics (in
the broad sense), the two judicial theories are considered within the
context of my political axis. Liberalism finds expression in both for-
mali~m and functionalism. Formalism is rejected by the radicals and
functionalism is redefined to suit new political agendas. Both the
C.L.S. school of thought and the feminist one regard the existing state
of law as dysfunctional. Members of C.L.S. regard it as dysfunctional
for a range of reasons. Those influenced by Marxism see law as a
major vehicle for promoting the capitalist state and oppressing the
workers. Members of the modernist branch of C.L.S. decry the dan-
gers of reifying the law and diverting energies from a more fruitful
political struggle. Feminists regard law as yet another means ofimpos-
ing a male view of the world and oppressing women. The goal of
both groups is to redefine the goals of law and make it functional in
a new sense. This I have labeled-radical functionalism.
Formalism is a term used to describe a particular form ofjudg-
ment writing, but more importantly, it is descriptive of a variant of
judicial reasoning. A crucial tenet of formalism is that law is an au-
tonomous entity with a coherence of its own. Logic and rationality
are the watchwords of formalism and law is seen as a set of rules and
principles that make sense and can be discovered by judges. The cre-
ation of categories and dichotomies is characteristic of formalism.
There is a scientific element to much of formalism and in some cases
even religious overtones. Formalists are generally concerned about ob-
jectivity and a search for truth. It is individualistic in orientation and
accepts hierarchies as part of the natural order of things. In formalist
thought, law is above politics and has an independent existence.
Americans sometimes refer to formalism as "classical" legal thought,
but there is no exact classical legal period in Canada as it existed in
the United States. 99
Formalism is an underlying idea of the current legal order. 10 It
has an important influence on judges and how they approach the law.
99 D. Kennedy, "Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940" (1980), 3 Res. in
Law and Society 1.
100 R. Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York: The Free Press, 1976).
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Mark Gold describes the link between formalism and judging as fol-
lows:
A formalist style of judgment writing is not related logically to any one
theory of law; one is just as apt to encounter formalism in a judgment
ostensibly rooted in natural law as in one informed by a positivist theory
of law. Nevertheless, there is a certain image of law that one tends to find
implicit in a formalistically styled judgment, and that is the conception
of law as originating outside the actual decision of the judge. That "out-
side" may be the will of the legislator, the perceived imperatives of nat-
ural law, or that brooding omnipresence of the waiting to be discovered,
but never created, common law. The common feature of all of these vari-
ations is the image of law and adjudication as somehow impersonal, ob-
jective and autonomous from the will of the judge. This view probably
captures the public's general appreciation of courts and law, and remains
an ideal around which much of the legal profession will rally.""' [footnotes
omitted]
Functionalism is more amorphous than formalism and embraces
a wider range of schools of thought. By redefining the functions, it
can even be adopted by the radical pole of my political axis. The crit-
ical feature of this school ofjudicial thought is that it is often teleolog-
ical. 0 2 Law is not an end in itself but a means to certain goals. These
goals are political and social in nature, ranging from the ill-defined
"good" of the liberal state to much more specific objectives. 0 3
Functionalism is flexible and adaptable in contrast to the rigid
categories of formalism. While formalism is inward looking and
legocrentric, functionalism is outward looking and views law as part
of the larger social and political structure. Most functionalists consider
law to be at least semi-autonomous but not independent from the
larger society.
One of the judicial approaches often associated with
functionalism is interest balancing.'4 Once law is accepted as a means
101 Gold, supra, note 32 at p. 461.
102 It is interesting to note that academics have called on judges to pursue a teleolog-
ical mandate under the Charter. Lyon, supra, note 1.
103 Moral goals may also be pursued as part of functionalism, and it would thus
include even some natural law theories. Law and economics would be another
brand of functionalism in which law would be yet another means to economic
efficiency.
104 Gold, supra, note 32, counterposes formalism and interest balancing. He also
refers to the American equivalent dichotomy as classical and public law adjudi-
cation as defined in, Chayes, "Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court" (1982), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4.
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to social goals, judges can legitimately pursue those goals by a balanc-
ing of competing interests and values. Two important questions are
left open by an interest balancing approach. What interests should be
put on the balance? To what goal is the balancing of interests aimed?
If strictly legal interests are balanced, then it is an example of for-
malism rather than functionalism. If only non-legal interests are ba-
lanced, it is functionalism in its most externalized form. As new in-
terests are introduced to the balance and novel functions of law articu-
lated, functionalism changes shape. Whatever its shapes, judges are
involved in a more political process and the line between law and poli-
tics is blurred.
(b) Liberal Legalism: Mainstream Thought
(i) Formalism
As a more concrete illustration of formalism I shall briefly discuss
three recognized schools of legal thought. These schools are Natural
Law, Positivism and Dworkinian interpretivism. There were other
possible candidates for discussion such as the Law and Economics
school of thought, which some would consider formalist. All of the
above theories also have elements of functionalism, so there is overlap
between the categories.
A. Natural Law. There are many variants of natural law, and like
most legal theories it has evolved over time. Centuries after the term
was coined there is still no agreement upon what the term means. In
the classical sense of the term, natural law has three major characteris-
tics: it'is universal and immutable in content, although its application
may change over time; it is superior in force to written law in either
legislative or judgment form; it is discoverable by reason or intuition
and it is a judge's task to discover the natural law and apply it to a
particular fact situation.0 3 In many respects, natural law is analogous
to the objectivist position in ethics. " Natural law accepts the exis-
105 My discussions of both natural law and positivism are based in part on useful
letters on this topic exchanged by my Benchmarks co-authors, Ed McBride and
Randall Balcome, between August and November 1985. 1 am particularly indebt-
ed to the September 4, 1985 and November 12, 1985 letters of Mr. Balcome,
whom I must confess won me over to his side of the natural law debate. In all
likelihood this is because we share a similar subjectivist disposition.
106 J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Singapore: Penguin Books, 1983).
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tence of an external reality beyond the subjective experience of indi-
viduals. For some early theorists such as Thomas Aquinas this external
source was divine. 1
07
Contemporary proponents of natural law have downplayed the
external sources of law but have not abandoned it. External sources of
law can now be more secular and implicit in the conditions of group
life. Lon Fuller articulates this position:
there are external criteria found in the conditions required for successful
group living, that furnish some standard against which the rightness of
his decision should be measured.' 0
For Fuller, one of the common threads of natural law in all forms is
the pursuit of the basic principles of the social order that would allow
satisfactory community life. " These principles represent a wedding
of law and morality that is characteristic of natural law.
Not all modern writers accept this secularization of natural law.
Canadian philosopher George Grant articulates the followng version
of natural law:
[t]here is an order in the universe which human reason can discover and
according to which the human will must act so that it can attune itself
to the universal harmony. Human beings in choosing their purposes must
recognize that if these purposes are to be right, they must be those which
are proper to the place mankind holds within the framework of universal
law. We do not make this law, but are made to live within it.1O
Descriptions of natural law as a discrete body of knowledge external
to individual judges and morally based are classic examples of for-
malism. It is the logic and rationality of the natural law that dictates
certain legal results and not naked politics or the subjective views of
a particular judge. Because of its appeal to morality or higher logic,
it is an excellent rhetorical device for judges, whether or not they ac-
cept natural law theory. It is the potential use of natural law as a means
of legitimating value choices that concerns the critics of liberalism.
The idealized version of natural law resembles a caricature and is
107 The historical context of natural law is set in Q. Skinner, Foundations of Modern
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978).
108 L. Fuller, "Reasons and Fiat in Case Law" (1946), 59 Harv. L. Rev. 376 at 379.
109 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969).
110 G. Grant, Philosophy iz the Mass Age (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1966), p. 29.
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easily attacked. More modern formulations, most notably that of Fin-
nis, move natural law closer to positivism and in some respects even
functionalism.'I According to Finnis, there are basic values or self-evi-
dent goods that a legal structure should be designed to promote. He
lists seven such objective values-life, knowledge, play, aesthetic ex-
perience, sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness and reli-
gion. In this restated version, the line between formalism and
functionalism is blurred.
B. Positivism, The accepted dichotomy between natural law and
positivism may be false. They are both formalist theories and are only
different points within a fairly narrow spectrum. There are, however,
significant differences in emphasis. While natural law in its idealized
form weds law and morals, positivism is dedicated to a separation of
the two. Like natural lawyers, positivists see the law as a coherent
pattern of rules that is clear, concise and certain. Positivists emphasize
the written law rather than some higher source and are thus more
secular in their approach. Because the written law can change over
time, the positivist is more relativist and is not inclined to objective
and immutable rules. They share with the natural lawyers the view
that law is autonomous and rational.
The logical and rational aspects of positivism are emphasized in
the writings of Hans Kelsen. 112 While my knowledge of Kelsen comes
only from secondary sources, he appears to be concerned with empir-
ical statements about the world that can be verified by observation
and experiment. The critical question for Kelsen is in what way can
statements about law be verified in reality. Since only written laws
were susceptible of such verification, they were the core of law. While
moral jdugments about the positivist law were relevant, they were
distinct from law itself. Unlike the classical natural lawyer, Kelsen
separates the empirical question of what is from the moral question
of what ought to be.
Another leading exponent of positivism is H.L.A. Hart." 3 Con-
111 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). The
move towards positivism and functionalism is supported by N. MacCormick,
"Natural Law Reconsidered" (1981), 1 OxfordJ. of Legal Studies 99 at 109.
112 H. Kelsen, What is Justice (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1971) and Pure Theory
ofLaw (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1967).
113 H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1983); Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); supra, note
15 and "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958), 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 593.
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solidating the earlier works of Austin and Bentham, Hart identifies
three major themes of positivism. First, there is a separation between
law and morals. Second, the analytical and scientific study of legal
concepts is important. Third, law is essentially a command. In Austi-
nian terms, the command was that of the sovereign. Hart goes on to
formulate positivism in a way that brings it closer to natural law in
its modem version.
Since positivists emphasized the written law, they had to accept
a hierarchy of authority with a special place for the rule giver. The
role of courts was fairly limited, except for the evolution of the com-
mon law, and the primary source of the law was the legislatures. Be-
cause positivism, like natural law, was individualistic in focus, the sur-
render of authority to government had to be justified on the basis of
a social contract. 1 4 This thinking still affects commentators on the
Charter, as there has been a call for renewing the social contract in
light of the Charter."'
Positivism is another convenient legal theory for allowing judges
to make value choices, while pretending to make a mechanical and
logical application of the law. In Charter cases it will be difficult for
judges to articulate a separation of legal and moral issues; but judges
will continue to insist on a rule of law rather than surrender to admit-
tedly subjective responses to complex moral choices. Positivism can
also be redefined; the written law now includes the Charter in a pre-
eminent constitutional form and thus expands the role ofjudges even
on this theory.
In a positivist tradition, open-ended concepts such as equality
would offer little guidance to judges. This is a concern for Hart and
other positivists.
Again, although Hart refers to the implications of what he calls the ap-
proximate equality between human beings, he himself recognises that no
universal system of natural law or justice can be based upon the principle
of impartiality, or that of treating like cases alike. For the essential ques-
tion here is by what criteria we are to determine which cases are to be
treated as alike, and no such feature of the physical or psychosomatic
condition of human beings as embodied in the idea of approximate equal-
ity can indicate how a society may decide which cases are alike for this
114 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. T.P. Peardon (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1952) and T. Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1958) are two examples.
115 Roman, supra, note 56.
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purpose. Hindu society may justify distinguishing between categories of
persons on the footing of the caste system, and other societies may regard
as essentially unlike, slaves and freemen, male and female, or black and
white, and so forth. The rule of equality, therefore, cannot be derived
from any formal principle of impartiality, any more than it can be derived
from the physical or psychic nature of human beings or from the charac-
ter of human practice and experience in this or other ages. The idea of
equality or non-discrimination is essentially a value-judgment which can-
not be derived from any assertions or speculations regarding the nature
of man. No insistence, therefore, on the idea of impartiality, or the rules
of natural justice, or the "inner morality" of the law in the sense used
by Professor Fuller can afford a basis for arriving at such a principle as
that of non-discrimination. This, indeed, is fully recognised by Hart him-
self, when he remarks that the idea of impartiality is "unfortunately com-
patible with very great iniquity".. [footnotes omitted]
C. Dworkiniant Interpretivism. Ronald Dworkint 7 occupies such a
central position in current legal theory that it is difficult to know
where to begin. He is not a positivist and he denies that he is a natural
lawyer. Even putting him under the label of formalism might be ob-
jectionable, as Dworkin sees the pursuit of equality and justice as an
important function of law. Nonetheless, there is an insistence on the
autonomy and rationality of law as distinct from politics, that marks
him as a formalist-albeit a sophisticated and modem one. In spite of
his novel approaches, Dworkin does have deep roots in liberalism and
some argue that he parallels A.V. Dicey on basic issues such as the
rule of law.118 For Dworkin, the ideal world would be composed of
individuals armed with rights against each other and the state, pursu-
ing their own goals in a world of equal opportunity. He is more op-
timistic than Hart about equality as an organizing principle of soci-
ety. 119.
A concise summary of Dworkin's more recent views is presented
by Allan Hutchinson in the following passage:
116 Lloyd and M. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction toJuriprudence, 5th ed. (London: Ste-
vens & Sons Ltd., 1986), Ch. 3.
117 Dworkin, supra, note 14.
118 N. MacCormick, "Jurisprudence and the Constitution" (1983), 36 Current
Legal Prob. 13.
119 Dworkin has generally not been well received by feminists who advocate a
broader definition of equality. However, his principle of equal respect and con-
cern has been applauded by women as well as men: S. Sherwin, "Taking Rights
Seriously" (1979), 5 Dal. L.J. 818.
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Dworkin's most recent writings have sought to demonstrate that
"law . . . is deeply and thoroughly political . . . , [b]ut not a matter of
personal or partisan politics". Judges are political actors, but their power
is constrained by a society's history and its democratic character. The
state does not give them a blank cheque on which to write in the political
currency of their choice; "judges should decide hard cases by interpreting
a political structure of their community . . . by trying to find the best
justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the [legal]
structure as a whole". For Dworkin, legal theory is not so much about
the legal materials, but the reading of them. The judge must breathe polit-
ical life into the dormant words of legal texts. This is done by applying
the twin tests of "formal fit" and "substantive justice". Any interpreta-
tion of the legal materials must be able to demonstrate some plausible
connection with society's legal history. However, the better theory is not
necessarily the one that accounts for the most decisions or opinions. It is
only a heuristic device or rule-of-thumb. Accordingly, simply because
Judge Posner might claim that his "economic efficiency" thesis seems to
explain more cases than a "rights" thesis does not settle the jurispruden-
tial debate in his favour. The requirement of fit interacts with the second
requirement of "substantive justice" and merely acts as a threshold; "if
an interpretation . . . is far superior 'substantively' it may be given the
benefit of a less stringent test of fit for that reason.'120 [footnotes omitted]
Dworkin's formalism also emerges in his approach to interpreta-
tion. He believes that there is a right answer to even complex legal
problems and that it can be found by the Herculean judge. 12' Dworkin
compares judges to a series of writers of chain novels with the later
judges being restricted by what has been written before. The writers
of the early chapters in the series of chain novels are least restrained.
On this analysis, current judges are less restrained in dealing with the
Charter than those who will come later to the task. This is true in
practical as well as theoretical terms.
The interaction of the subjective reader and the objective text is
recognized by Dworkin, but his emphasis is on the latter. This has
implications for Charter interpretation. Using his analogy to the chess
game, the underlying principles of the Charter into which individual
cases must fit might be those implicit in a "free and democratic" soci-
ety. In Dworkin's view, these should include equality, but time will
tell whether judges agree. On his constructive model of morals,
judges would be required to dearly articulate their decisions.
120 A. Hutchinson, "Of Kings and Dirty Rascals: The Struggle for Democracy"
(1984), 9 Queen's L.J. 271 at 277-78.
121 Dworkin, supra, note 14.
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The "constructive" model does not assume, as the natural model does,
that principles ofjustice have some fixed, objective existence, so that de-
scriptions of these principles must be true or false in some standard
way.... It makes the different, and in some ways more complex as-
sumption, that men and women have a responsibility to fit the particular
judgments on which they act into a coherent program of action, or, at
least, that officials who exercise power over other men have that sort of
responsibility.'22
(ii) Functionalism
A. Interpretivism. The interpretivist school of legal theory bor-
rows heavily from the field of literary criticism and stresses the in-
terplay between the reader and the text. There is a significant debate
within this school between the objectivists, of which Ronald Dworkin
is a prime example, and the subjectivists, who focus on the reader
more than the text. The latter group stresses that there are many mean-
ings that can be drawn from a particular text and not just a correct
objective meaning as Dworkin seems to suggest.
Owen Fiss has often been associated with the Drowkin side of
this debate and might properly be categorized as a formalist. Fiss,
however, occupies a position between the two extremes ofobjectivism
and subjectivism. He recognizes that there are objective and subjective
elements to interpretation, and that the range of valid interpretations
of a particular text is restricted by the nature of the particular interpre-
tive community.10
These theories of interpretation have obvious implications for
constitutional interpretation of the Charter. Fiss has made the follow-
ing observation about the role of courts in the American constitutional
process:
[t]he rightful place of courts in our political system turns on the existence
of public values and on the promise of those institutions-because they
are independent and because they must engage in a special dialogue-to
articulate and elaborate the true meaning of those values. The task [is]
discovering the meaning of constitutional values such as equality, liberty,
due process or property.
1 2 4
122 Ibid., p. 160.
123 0. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982), 34 Stanford L.R. 739.
124 0. Fiss, "The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice"
(1979), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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That is certainly the task that will face Canadian judges in interpreting
the Charter, but how should they pursue the task?
Stanley Fish, who is also considered a moderate on inter-
pretivism, is closer to the subjective position. He has taken direct issue
with Dworkin and sees claims to objectivity in the text as closing off
discussion.
IT]he objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous
illusion, because it is physically convincing. The illusion is one of self-
sufficiency and completeness. A line of print on a page is so obviously
there . . . that it seems to be the sole repository of whatever value and
meaning we associate with it. 12
Fish does not stress the power of the legal text or the author; rather;,
he emphasizes the power of the reader. In the Charter context, this
would de-emphasize the precise language of the document and the
intent of its creators in favour of the interpretive power of the judge.
Interpretation, according to Fish, is not the art of construing but the
art of construction. Poems are not decoded but created by the
reader. 126 He does not posit absolute freedom in the hands of the in-
terpreter, but like Fiss, stresses the limits of the interpretive commu-
nity in both literature and law. The shared values of a particular com-
munity allow the interpreter to judge between meanings that are "on
or off the wall.' ' 27
What is the appropriate "interpretive community" to which
judges should refer in giving meaning to the Charter? Is it the larger
political and social community or is it the smaller circle ofjudges and
lawyers? It should be the former, but the main tasks of interpretation
and Charter advocacy will be in the hands of people who are legally
trained. Even if the larger political community is considered, will it
be only those who accept mainstream liberal thinking or will it also
include more radical schools? Canada's free and democratic tradition
suggests that the interpretive community will be a liberal one.
On the subjectivist extreme of the interpretivist school is Sanford
125 S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge- Harvard Univ. Press, 19(), p. 43.
126 Ibid., p. 327.
127 Fish expands upon some of his ideas in "Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision"
(1982), 60 Texas L.R. 495; "Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law
and Literature" (1982), 60 Texas L.R. 551 and "Wrong Again" (1983), 62 Texas
L.R. 299.
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Levinson. He has been attacked by Fiss as representative of a school
of nihilists who have turned their backs on adjudication, in favour of
a romance with politics. 128 Levinson, in political terms, might fall on
the radical rather than liberal pole of my political axis. Drawing upon
continental European philosophers, Levinson is concerned with de-
construction in literature and law. He concludes that there are no cor-
rect principles of interpretation but rather a cacophony of conflicting
interpretations from which the individual interpreter must choose.129
Showing his liberal roots, he applauds this plurality of interpretations,
but on a more radical note he argues that the choice of meaning will
depend on the purposes of the interpreter. The interpretivist school in
general reaffirms a functional view of law and underscores the impor-
-tance of the judge as interpreter. It tells us little about the precise finc-
tion of law.
D. The Sociological School and the Realists. Members of the
sociological school were the first to clearly reject formalism as the
proper legal theory. The seeds of the more radical C.L.S. critique were
sown by members of the sociological school and its off-spring-the
realiss. Oliver Wendell Holmes predates the sociological school but
he expressed its essence when he proclaimed "the life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience."' 130 It was Roscoe Pound, as
Dean of Harvard Law School, who developed the theory of sociolog-
ical jurisprudence and coined the phrase "mechanical jurisprudence"
to describe the formalism that he rejected.131 Justice Benjamin Cardozo
applied the theory developed by Pound to the task of judging and
expounded his insights in a famous lecture series that was later pub-
lished. 1
32
The sociological school represents more than a rejection of for-
malism; it also represents a clear statement of a functional approach
to law. If legal conclusions are not logically dictated, then some other
128 Supra, note 123 at p. 746.
129 S. Levinson, "Law as Literature" (1982), 60 Texas L.R. 373.
130 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, ed. Howe (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1963), p. 5. He further elaborated on his views in, "The Path of the Law" (1897),
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457.
131 R. Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence" (1908), 8 Col. L.R. 605. Pound's views
are more fully developed in Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, rev. ed. (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954).
132 B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1921).
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theory must explain them. This theory was that the law was an instru-
ment to promote shared social goals within a society. The important
thing was the goal being pursued and not the logic and methodology.
Cardozo articulated this aspect of the theory clearly.
Not the origin, but the goal is the main thing. There can be no wisdom
in the choice of a path unless we know where it will lead. The teleological
conception of his function must be ever in the judge's mind. .... '33
Because of the shift of emphasis from the internal logic of the
law to the social goals it was designed to achieve, there was a need
for extra-legal sources to resolve legal disputes. Social facts rather than
arid law became the order of the day. Jerome Frank referred to himself
as a fact skeptic and insisted that, even if a rule were relatively clear,
the lower courts and juries decided cases on the basis of their interpre-
tation of the facts.'
34
As Denise Raume indicates, there are clear links between the
American school of sociological jurisprudence and Canada. 35 This is
most notable in respect to Laskin, who studied under Felix Frankfurter
in the United States, and under and with Caesar Wright in Canada.
The influence of the sociological school on Laskin is reflected both in
his speeches and his academic writings. 36 The rejection of the for-
malist tradition emphasizes that judges make choices and that they
must look to broader social facts to make good choices. Law is not
autonomous, but part of the larger society. These insights have obvi-
ous implications for the Charter and judging. Judges must not apply
mechanical rules, but be prepared to make value choices after being
informed by a wide range of sources. This opening up of the legal
discourse to other disciplines would be a significant advance.
One of the major problems with the theories of the early
sociological school is that it assumed a homogeneous society in which
there were shared views about what was good. The realists who
133 Ibid., pp. 102-103, as cited in D. R6aume, "The Judicial Philosophy of Bora
Laskin" (1985), 45 U. of T. L.J. 438 at 445. 1 am generally indebted to this article
for this encapsulated account of sociological jurisprudence.
134 J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Coward McCann Inc., 1930).
135 R~aume, supra, note 133. These links are apparent at the academic as well as
judicial levels. Lederman, supra, note 26, sees the Charter as an expression of
shared values. This view is articulated more directly in L. Barry, "Law, Policy
and Statutory Interpretation under a Constitutionally Entrenched Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982), 60 Can. Bar R. 237.
136 R6aume, supra, note 133 at pp. 442-47.
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emerged from the sociological school recognized that there are con-
flicting groups in society who pursue different sets of goals. When the
state steps in to make value choices, it favours one group over another.
Thus the realists identified the inherently political dimensions of law,
long before C.L.S. did.
There was also a scientific tone to the realist movement as legal
academics discovered the world of social science.'37 Once they re-
moved the blinkers of formalism, realists recognized that there was
great freedom of choice in the individual judge. There was thus con-
cern with predicting his or her behavior and finding constraints to
judicial action. Some realists also recognized that most legal disputes
are sorted out in the lower courts or administrative tribunals, if they
go to formal adjudication at all. The emphasis on appellate judging
may be misplaced. Therein lies an important insight for evaluating
the real impact of the Charter. The political dimensions of judicial
choice is another insight that has been expanded into more radical
traditions.
(c) Critics of Liberalism: Radical Functionalism
(i) Critical Legal Studies
C.L.S. proposes a radical and direct frontal attack on liberal
legalism. They do not wish to merely reform the existing legal struc-
ture, but to deconstruct it and put a new one in its place. Unlike many
of their predecessors, members of C.L.S. consider themselves a polit-
ical movement and attack the legal establishment as a matter of ideol-
ogy. While many of their conclusions are not that jarring, the blunt-
ness and unconventional nature of their attack is. Allan Hutchinson
gives the following description of C.L.S. in the context of a review
of Dworkin.
Notwithstanding the success of these particular challenges, the most un-
relenting and unmitigated campaign against Ronald Dworkin has been
waged by the so-called "Critical Legal Scholars". Put crudely, the main
thrust of the Critical attack has been to follow through on the realist pro-
ject and ally it to a programme of leftist radical politics. At its best, it
has also incorporated the telling intellectual insights of a number of con-
137 A good example of a realist is K.W. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (New
York: Little, Brown & Co., 1960). His work is discussed in the larger context
by W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicholson Ltd., 1973).
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tinental philosophers. The major unifying feature of the group is its op-
position to the intellectual and political dominance of the liberal establish-
ment. As such, the group contains many different strands and its mem-
bers run from the militant marxist through the disaffected liberal to the
utopian anarchist."3 [footnote omitted]
The origins of C.L. S. further accentuate its break with liberalism
even in its realist stage. Rather than summarize, I shall quote from
two Canadian scholars who have brought an awareness of C.L.S. to
Canadians as well as Americans.
The C.L.S. movement was formally founded in 1977 by a small
group of scholars who had become dissatisfied with the intellectual mood
and direction of the Law and Society Association. These scholars took
the view that the Association had become too closely identified with the
"empirico-behaviorist" wing of social science and that the road to juris-
prudential enlightenment lay down a less data-oriented, more theoretical
path. The lifeblood of the C.L.S. movement was to be philosophy, not
science.
From this splinter group, the Movement has mushroomed to a mem-
bership of 350. Its sixth annual conference at Harvard in the spring of
1982 attracted an audience of almost one thousand. Articles and notes
with a Critical flavor are fast becoming a regular feature of many law
reviews. The influence of C.L.S. is percolating through all levels of
American law schools, from the New College of California to Harvard
Law School. Its leading members include such accomplished scholars as
Peter Gabel, Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, Karl Klare, Mark
Tushnet, and Roberto Unger. 1
9
By denying the autonomous existence of law and revealing the
inherent contradictions in the liberal state, C.L.S. is built upon the
primary insights of the realists. '40 There is no agreed upon set of polit-
ical principles for C.L.S., nor a single methodology, but there is a
concern with the link between scholarship and practice on one hand,
and the struggle for a more humane, egalitarian and democratic soci-
ety on the other. 141 Members of C.L.S. seek to explore the deep struc-
138 Supra, note 120 at p. 279.
139 A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, "Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars:
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought" (1994), 36 Stanford L.R.
199 at 200-201.
140 M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in De-
construction" (1984), 36 Stanford L.R. 623 at 626.
141 D. Kennedy and K. Klare, "A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies" (1984),
94 Yale L.J. 461 at 461.
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tures of law that underly surface legal reasoning, in a way that moves
them beyond the realists. 4 There is at least one Canadian application
of this deep structures analysis of the law. 143
A. The Assault on Liberalism. The C.L.S. attack on liberalism is
so far reaching that it is hard to know where to begin. Once again I
shall reply on a pithy quote from Allan Hutchinson which captures
many elements of the critique of liberalism.
The enterprises of adjudication and legal scholarship merely serve to
clothe this political organization with the essential garments of political
legitimacy. Judges and scholars enable society to convince people that its
present organization is not only rational and just, but necessary and in-
evitable. The construction of elaborate schemes and entitlements from
available materials helps to justify the status quo and direct formidable
barriers to social change. By pretending that legal outcomes are the prod-
uct of an apolitical and neutral algorithm rather than the imposed prefer-
ences of an elite hierarchy, the rule of law manages to transform the
jungle of social order into a world of legal right. Legal thought helps to
suppress the horrible conditions of social life and offers itself as a timeless
way of understanding and conquering the world. The esoteric and convo-
luted nature of legal discourse is the direct consequence of the need to
obscure and mystify judicial choice. The evolution of legal doctrine is
best understood as an endless series of fragile and makeshift com-
promises. At bottom, legal discourse is nothing more than a stylized ver-
sion of political discourse."'
The legitimating role of law is an important element of the C.L.S.
attack. As Kennedy states, legal consciousness is created to obscure
the fact that law and judging are simple matters of power politics. 14s
Because liberal legalism is full of contradictions, not the least of which
is the pursuit of individual rights and membership in a community,
Kennedy asserts that legal fictions must be created to hide inconsisten-
cies. 146 There is a frontal attack on the rationality and coherence of
liberalism in either its formalist or functionalist guises.
142 Kennedy, supra, note 19.
143 P. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism"
(1984), 34 U. of T. L.J. 47. Not only does he unmask the basic tension between
a provincialist and pan-Canadian view of federalism, which underlies the cases,
he also concludes that the legal reasoning is designed to hide the political
choices.
144 Supra, note 120 at pp. 280-81.
145 Supra, note 99.
146 Supra, note 19.
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Unger has simplified the critique of liberal legalism into two
branches-an attack on formalism and an attack on objectivism. 4 7 The
creation of categories, dichotomies and hierarchies is at the core of
mainstream legal thought. These are rejected as smoke screens to hide
political choices. Since C.L.S. members reject the autonomy of law,
formalism is not acceptable.
The attack on objectivism is more complex. A full embrace of
subjectivism would lead to a nihilist position, which most members
of C.L.S. deny. In terms of adjudication, the objectivism of the liberal
state emerges in the form of neutral principles. Judges do not impose
values but decide cases on the basis of neutral principles. Paul Brest
refutes such a claim in the following words:
[tihe fact is that all adjudication requires making choices among the levels
of generality on which to articulate principles, and all such choices are
inherently non-neutral. No form of constitutional decision-making can
be salvaged if its legitimacy depends on satisfying Bork's requirement
that principles be "neutrally derived, defined and applied."'
As a further assault on the idea of neutral principles, Mark
Tushnet argues that the values imposed under the guise of neutrality
are not even those of liberal individualism but rather those implicit in
conservative thought. 149 The Charter will directly raise questions about
the neutrality of principles and the judges who apply them. While it
is highly unlikely that any judge would embrace the C.L.S. view, he
or she might profit from its skepticism about neutrality and other
basic assumptions of the liberal state.
B. The C.L.S. Program and Implications for Judging. While mem-
bers of C.L. S. are often attacked for having no constructive alternative
to the established order that they attack, this attack is not entirely fair.
Unger, in particular, has developed some rather elaborate theories for
a post liberal society. 50 Others have also attempted to describe the
legal world that would follow the deconstruction of the present legal
order. 15' There are religious overtones to these new versions of reality,
147 R. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561.
148 P. Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship" (1981), 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1091-92.
149 M. Tushnet, "Following The Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles" (1983), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 at 784-85.
150 Supra, notes 147, 100 and 38.
151 G.H. Taylor, "Deconstructing the Law" (1982), 1 Yale Law and Policy Rev. 158.
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even if they are secular in nature. David Fraser advocates "moral ter-
rorism" both as a means for disrupting the liberal state and imposing
a "better" version of reality.1
5 2
The implications of C.L.S. theory for judging are explored by
Joseph Singer in his study of a New Jersey judge-Justice Pashman." 3
Regarding law as indistinguishable from politics, Singer applauds an
activist judge who declares his political preferences overtly. An impor-
tant part of the C.L.S. project is to get politics out into the open, not
to decry its existence.
According to Justice Pashman, the question is not whether judges should
make law, but whose interests they should protect. He sought to increase
the number and variety of situations in which the legal system would
require the community to come to the aid of the weak and disadvantaged
in times of crisis. He also believes that the good society would be more
egalitarian than the one in which we live. He therefore used his power
to redistribute certain social and economic advantages from the
privileged to the powerless. Was this an abuse of his judicial power? The
answer depends not on abstract homilies about the judicial role, but with
whom we place our sympathies.'
S4
This is not a vision of judging that I would accept. While it is
important that judges be more open about their values, I do not feel
comfortable about judges being given a blank cheque to define the
good society. I am impressed by many aspects of the C.L.S. critique
of liberalism, but do not feel they offer a coherent and workable alter-
native. What they are really proposing is a revolution and judges are
unlikely people to occupy the barricades. We can profit from the in-
sights of the C.L.S. movement without degenerating into a world of
value terrorism. 15
(ii) Feminism
Some would argue that there is no coherent feminist jurispruden-
152 Supra, note 23 at pp. 773-75 and fn. 156.
153 J. Singer, "Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence" (1983), 35 Rutgers L.R. 275. In
typical C.L.S. fashion he acknowledges his debt to Duncan Kennedy in the form
of both conversations and unpublished manuscripts.
154 Ibid., p. 284.
155 Of course, we should not underestimate the extent to which value terrorism is
practised, in subtle forms, in the Canadian liberal state. Two wrongs do not
make a right.
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tial theory or, if it exists, it is in its infancy.S 6 The charge of a lack of
coherence is suspect, since it is an assessment made from a male per-
spective. Indeed, any of my comments in respect to feminist theory
should be carefully scrutinized, as I am a neophyte in this area. I do
not propose to present a comprehensive or ordered view of feminism,
but rather to suggest some of the perspectives from this school of
thought and how they could impinge on judging and equality. My
observations are impressionistic, but rather than ignore a significant
new force in legal thought I shall set them forth.
One problem with dealing with feminism at a theoretical level is
that it tends to be more specific and issue oriented. Approaching the
world from the perspectives of theory and abstractions is more typical
of a male approach, and Carol Gilligan informs us that this is not the
highest stage of moral development for women.15 7 She postulates that
women are more sensitive to the facts of a particular situation and less
inclined to abstract them to the level of grandiose principles. The val-
idity of stealing a loaf of bread would be considered in a the context
of the specific facts and not on the basis of the broader social structure.
Not all feminists are women, but since the majority are, I assume the
experience of women is more relevant to defining feminism than that
of men.
This issue specific focus of feminists can lead to an ad hoc approach
to the world. In respect to the Charter, it may mean interpreting the
various sections of the document in quite different ways to produce
outcomes that are favourable to women. In some respects this is simi-
lar to the approach of Justice Pashman, articulated by Singer.' s8 As
with C.L. S., this introduces a degree of subjectivity and unpredictabil-
ity that makes me uncomfortable. This may be a simple consequence
of my liberal, male roots. In any event, an ad hoc, what is best for
women, approach is really an argument against theory. If such an ap-
proach were adopted, it would leave open the questions of who de-
fines what is best for women and on what basis.
On the question of sources, I think the feminist perspective can
be quite helpful. While I do not claim to understand the methodology
of feminism, there is a concern about grounding conclusions in empir-
156 MacKinnon, supra, note 2, is at least working towards a theory of feminism
related to law.
157 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harv. Univ. Press, 1982).
158 Supra, note 154.
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ical reality rather than abstractions. This is reflected in reservations
about judicial definitions of equality. As indicated by Professors Boyle
and Noonan in their article on prostitution and pornography in this
volume, very different approaches to equality are needed to improve
the lot of women in these two settings. Just solutions are found not
in over-arching theories but in assessing the effects of different policies
on the factual situation.
It is also important that this empirical reality reflect the experi-
ences of women and that it not be gender blind. Discriminations can
be subtle in form and the real test is in actual outcomes. This is the
thrust of the following passage from the report of the Charter of
Rights Educational Fund:
[d]iscrimination can be subtle; it can be an unconscious or unintended
by-product of otherwise beneficial legislation .... The discrimination
may be expressly set out in the wording of the statute; it may be implicit
rather than overtly stated. Discrimination may result from the application
of seemingly neutral provisions; even failure to legislate in a particular
area may have a disparate impact. 1S9
Having proclaimed the value of theory as a means to giving
coherence to Charter jurisprudence, I think it is also important that
the value of rights be assessed in relation to the real needs of those
who are disadvantaged in society. This perspective is not unique to
feminism but is an echo of the call for social facts to inform the courts,
as stated by the sociological school, the realists and C.L.S. All these
theories coalesce to make a strong case for functionalism as opposed
to formalism, as the more likely route to an egalitarian society.
The dangers of a static theory of equality are also emphasized by
the changing definitions of equality and liberation within the feminist
movement itself. It is not enough that women be treated exactly like
men. Indeed, such an approach could accentuate inequality. There is
a growing awareness of the "specificity" of women, and this necessi-
tates different treatment. Parallel to this is the recognition that tradi-
tional female values should be accentuated and allowed to flourish,
rather than sacrificed in pursuit of equality with men. These aspects
of integrative feminism have been developed by Angela Miles, and it
159 C.R.E.F., Report on the Statute Audit Project (Toronto: C.R.E.F., 1985), p. 1.4.
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would be an important perspective for judges to consider when deal-
ing with equality issues related to women.1 60 Miles would argue that
just considering feminism as one other perspective in the liberal mix
is not enough. It must be seen as part of the immanent critique of the
established society.161 It is thus properly categorized as radical
functionalism.
A practical Charter question of great significance to women is the
extension of the Charter to the private sector. This issue is explored
by Hester Lessard's article in this volume and has been raised by other
feminist thinkers. 62 The false dichotomy between the public and the
private is also one of the categories of formalism attacked by the mem-
bers of C.L.S. This is another sense in which the two forms of radical
functionalism converge. The two groups would also agree on the
political nature ofjudicial choices, but disagree on who were the major
victims of such choices.
As a final observation on feminism, its adherents voice legitimate
concern about having the Charter interpreted by a predominantly male
judiciary. This is slowly changing but until there are more feminist
women on the Bench, feminists will have to educate the existing
judges. 163There has been little speculation about what a feminist judge
would do with the law generally or the Charter in particular. It may
be some time before Canada has a practising example.164
160 A Miles, "Ideological Hegemony in Political Discourse: Women's Specificity
and Equality," in Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics, G. Finn and A.
Miles, eds. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982); "The Integrative Feminine
Principle in North American Feminist Radicalism: Value Basis of a New
Feminism" (1981), 4 Women's Studies Int'l. Q. 481, and "Feminism, Equality
and Liberation" (1985), 1 Can. J. of Women and the Law 42.
161 A. Miles, "Feminist Radicalism in the 1980's" (1985), 9 Can. J. of Pol. and Soc.
Theory 16 and "Integrative Feminism" (1984), 19 Fireweed 55.
162 K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
1985). From a less committed perspective the application issue is also explored
by Y. de Montigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights," in Equality Rights and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, A.F. Bayesfsky and M. Eberts, eds.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985).
163 This is presumably one of the aims of a conference entitled, Socialization ofJudges
to Equality Issues, organized for Banff, Alberta on May 22-24, 1986.
164 C. Boyle, in "Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge" (19851, 1 Can. J. of
Women and the Law 93, speculates on what a feminist judge might do in one
particular area. More recently, Professor Boyle has co-authored a Status of
Women study on a feminist analysis of criminal law, which has implications for
judging.
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(d) The Limits of the Rights Paradigm and Legal Discourse
There is a massive discrepancy between the world as imagined and de-
picted by lawyers and the actual conditions of social life. This naivety is
evidenced by Dworkin's belief that the courts can act as the crucial public
institutional forum in which a community can meet "the challenge of
making the standards that govern our collective life articulate, coherent
and effective". Yet there is ample evidence to demonstrate that this is
nothing more than a ritualistic reaffirmation of our vague commitment
to justice and fairness. Moreover, it is an elite ceremony, administered
and controled by the initiated few. Legal change does not amount to so-
cial change. Canadians' experience with the introduction of the Charter
of Rights illustrates this weakness. Established through a profoundly un-
democratic process, it is hailed as a watershed in the life of each and every
Canadian. With the strength of the Charter around them, Canadians are
now said to be fuller and freer individuals. But the actual impact on the
iquality and standard of life is marginal and peripheral. It has had no effect
upon the vast disparity of wealth and power within our society. Any
changes are merely rhetorical. Its greatest impact has been to change our
culture of legal and political argument. Where was the Charter when B.C.
workers were being arbitrarily dismissed from their government posts?
What help has the Charter been to the record number of homeless on the
streets of our large cities? What assistance has the Charter offered to the
millions who are unemployed and socially frustrated? Valuable energy
and attention will now be deflected into Charter arguments and litiga-
tions. 161 [footnotes omitted]
It is a basic tenet of the C.L.S. movement that there are greater
dangers in the legalization of politics than there are in the politicization
of the law. There is the concern identified by Hutchinson in the above
quotation that valuable reform energies will be directed into legal bat-
tes rather than more meaningful political ones. Another basic concern
is that unfair political action will be legitimated under such doctrines
as the rule of law.'66 Law can be used to add moral authority and the
appearance of objectivity to what would otherwise be seen as a naked
exercise of power by the state. 167 Even casting an issue in the form of
165 Supra, note 120 at pp. 285-86.
166 M. Mandel, "The Rule of Law and the Legalization of Politics in Canada"
(1985), 13 Int'l. J. of the Sociology of Law 273. I owe a general debt in this
section to my colleague, David Fraser, who gave me access to his unpublished
book review entitled, "Democracy or the Rule of Law? Some Thoughts on the
Rights Debate."
167 P. Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning" (1980), 3 Res. in Law and Sociology
25.
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legal rights can limit the dialogue and in some cases determine the
results. The real struggle for reform is diverted into a legal forum,
where a victory for the established order is pre-ordained.16
The effect of casting a value dispute in legal form can be to make
the claim less radical. It may, however, in its modest form, have some
chance of success. Unless there is going to be a real revolution in so-
ciety, changes outside accepted institutional channels will be limited.
It is important to recognize that charters of rights do not, in them-
selves, solve problems and that serious reform must be pursued on all
fronts. Courts cannot do everything, but I do not accept that judges
and charters are a negative influence, in all cases. Some times the Char-
ter will be used in positive ways, some times in negative. At other
times its impact will be neutral. The trick is not to expect too much
and to assess at the end of the day whether the lot of the disadvantaged
is better or worse.
Outside C.L.S., Robert Samek also recognized that law reform,
as contrasted with social law reform, was inherently limited.'69 Be-
cause legal discourse is itself limited, the kind of reform that emerges
from it will be similarly restricted. He seemed to be optimistic that
the legal discourse could be opened-up and thus promote more mean-
ingful reform.
Samek also recognized the dangers of confusing ends and
means. ' 70 At best, the Charter, as Canada's version of rights, is a means
to change and not a guarantee of that result. It is only the beginning
and not the end of a process of change. The Charter provides a
framework or mode of analysis for what are basic value disputes. It
is far from ideal, but it has some potential for change. There are limits
on the rights paradigm as an approach to equality, but since it is likely
to be around for some time,'7' lawyers and judges should attempt to
make creative use of it.
168 Supra, note 74.
169 R. Samek, "A Case For Social Law Reform" (1977), 55 Can. Bar R. 409.
170 R. Samek, The Meta Phenonenon (New York: Philosophical Library, 1981). In
this he identifies the ends and means confusion as one of the crucial obstacles
to change in society.
171 The rights paradigm is an integral part of the liberal state. This is not so with
C.L.S. The feminist position is less clear, but women may be more inclined to
a model of negotiation and accommodation than one of conflict. See Gilligan,
supra, note 157.
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(e) Concluding Thoughts on Theory, Judging and the Charter
I shall not by way of conclusion repeat the observations made
throughout this section connecting the various theories with the con-
cepts of judging, the Charter and equality. Some major themes will
be highlighted. There is value in both legal and political theory for
resolving practical judicial questions, such as, what voices should be
heard, what sources consulted and what interpretive strategy adopted
in respect to the Charter. Recognizing both the strengths and limita-
tions of theory in the liberal state helps to put judging in a broader
context.
Formalism should be abandoned in favour of a functional ap-
proach to law. This means a surrender of extravagant claims to objec-
tivity in both the Charter and the judging process. Whatever functional
theory is adopted (and it may vary from case to case), there is a clear
need for courts to be informed from extra-legal sources as well as
legal. Even the radical variants of functionalism should not be rejected
out of hand but accepted for the insights they can offer and the value
of doctrines that challenge established assumptions.
Theory should assist judges in developing a reasonable role for
themselves in using the Charter to promote equality. This role should
not be so modest as to shirk the new constitutional role of the courts,
or be so extravagant as to raise false expectations. There are limits on
whatjudges can do in a liberal state. Finally, we should all be reminded
that theory must be grounded in practice and Charter rights defined
in relation to those who are really in need.
5. JUDGING: INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
One of the lessons ofjudicial and political theory is that there are
limits on what judges can do with the Charter. How many limits de-
pend upon which theory is operable. In a more pragmatic sense, there
are also institutional and human limitations on judging. It is also the
human and personal side ofjudging that offers the greatest hope for
equality.
(a) Institutional Limitations
The nature of the institution ofjudging puts limits on what indi-
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vidual judges can do. This is a fact of life recognized by most Canadian
judges, and in notable written form by the late Chief Justice Laskin
and the present Chief Justice of Canada. 172 Constraints on judges is
also a common topic for judicial speeches whether in the form of com-
ments on broad concepts, such as the rule of law and judicial indepen-
dence, 73 or the limits implicit in the role ofjudging. 74 Credibility and
trust are the main sources ofjudicial power, and judges are concerned
that if they step too far beyond traditional judicial bounds their rulings
will lose legitimacy. Courts are conservative institutions and unlikely
breeding grounds for radicals. This should condition what we can
reasonably expect from courts under the Charter.
There are also a number of practical limitations on courts. Judges
cannot initiate cases, but must resolve actual disputes brought by
lawyers on behalf of their clients. Significant financial barriers to liti-
gation exist, as discussed earlier in this article. Moreover, the tradi-
tional devices for informing the court are inadequate and these in-
adequacies will be accentuated by the Charter. These limitations have
led some commentators to despair about the courts as dispensers of
equality.
Canada's judges are less well prepared for their new policy-making role
under section 15 than they are for their additional responsibilities in rela-
tion to criminal justice policy. Most will lack familiarity with the social
and economic programs that are likely to be challenged on section 15
grounds. The adjudicative process as it is now conducted in Canada is
not well designed to enable judges to obtain a good understanding of the
factual setting in which their decisions take place. But even if our judges
produce policy results which coincide with our political preferences, I
worry about what this judicialization of the resolution of equality issues
will do to the quality of our political life. Deciding questions of distribu-
tive justice is an essential responsibility of political man. Political life, as
Aristotle taught, rises above the organization of animal herds when it is
172 B. Laskin, The Institutional Character of the Judge (London: Oxford Press, 1972)
and B. Dickson,"The Judiciary-Law Interpreters or Law Makers" (1982), 12
Man. L.J. 1, are two examples.
173 B. Dickson, "The Rule of Law: Judicial Independence and the Separation of
Powers," an address to the Canadian Bar Association delivered in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, August 21, 1985, is one example.
174 B. Wilson, "Decision Making in the Supreme Court: Goodman Lecture No. 1,"
an address given at the University of Toronto as part of the Goodman Lecture
Series, November 26, 1985.
92 CHARTERWATCH: REFLECTIONS ON EQUALITY
characterized by man's distinctive capacity of expressing and exchanging
ideas about right and wrong. 17- [footnotes omitted]
It is important to remember that courts are part of a larger gov-
ernment structure with legislative and administrative branches, as well
as a judicial one. All are charged with promoting the rights guaranteed
by the Charter, including equality.' The question is which of the vari-
ous agencies will be the best promoter of equality? The answer will
depend upon the facts of a particular situation. In some cases, legis-
lators will be the best protectors of equality because they have the
scope and resources to pursue affirmative programs. Legislators
would not have been a good choice in Duplessis' Quebec.
Administrative boards such as human rights commissions are im-
portant agents for the promotion of equality. Boards are often more
accessible than courts, and their more informal procedures and struc-
ture may be better suited to the resolution of some complex rights
disputes. Of course, the nature of the individual board is important
in assessing the extent to which courts should be deferential to boards
on Charter issues. Such deference should not be based on the judicial
nature of the board but its comparative competence to deal with the
issue. David Mullan expresses concern that one of the spin-off effects
of the Charter could be an unhealthy revival of judicial activism in
reviewing boards.1" Because boards are likely to consider rights in
their social context, they may be more inviting for realists, members
of C.L.S. and feminists who emphasize social context. Other boards
may use their broad discretion in a discriminatory fashion, and the
Charter as a means ofjudicial review will be beneficial.
Perhaps the most significant institutional limit on judges is the
appointment process by which judges are selected. The process is
under revision and there have been advances. A special committee of
the Canadian Bar Association recommends the elimination of patron-
age based judicial appointments, in favour of a full merit system. The
only attempt at setting criteria by which to define merit results in this
list of characteristics for the judge:
175 P. Russell, "The effect of a Charter of Rights on the policy-making role of Cana-
dian courts" (1982), 25 Can. Pub. Admin. I at 25-26.
176 W. Mackay and C. Beckton, "Institutional and Constituticnal A rangements:
An Overview," in Recurring Issues in Canadian Federalism, C. Beckton and W.
MacKay, eds. (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 54-55.
177 D. Mullan, "Judicial Deference to Administrative Decision-Making in the Age
of the Charter," an address delivered as the inaugural Heald Lecture in Adminis-
trative Law at the University of Saskatoon, on November 5, 1985.
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-high moral character;
-human qualities; sympathy, generosity, charity and
patience;
-experience in law;
-intellectual and judgment ability;
-good health and good work habits;
-bilingualism, if required by the nature of the post.
The pursuit of merit appointments is laudable, but the above
criteria are quite vague. They are unlikely to change the character of
the judiciary, as a white, male elite. While ajudge need not experience
disadvantage to appreciate the plight of those who have, a variety of
perspectives and experiences would enhance the chances of change
through the Charter.17 As the interpretivist school demonstrates, the
judge as the interpreter of the constitutional text constructs meaning
out of the Charter. A more diverse and mixed judiciary would be more
likely to promote an egalitarian society.
(b) Human Dimensions
It is no longer sensible, if it ever was, to seek to depersonalize the judicial
role by saying that the Judge owes fidelity only to the LAW, that the
judge is merely the instrument that brings forth the law, as if the judicial
function consists in pulling the right levers or pushing the relevant but-
tons. 1
79
The term dimensions, rather than limitations, is used because the
human elements ofjudging are more positive than negative. It is now
generally accepted that there is a significant element of personal choice
in adjudication. What influences a judge in making a choice, where
he or she is not bound by some rule? This question is more important
when one notes that there are very few rules that can bind an innova-
tivejudge. Choices are more often the result of a balancing of compet-
ing values, and that is what the Charter invites. It is less clear where
these values will come from--society at large, established society,
178 W. Mackay and R. Bauman, "The Supreme Court of Canada: Reform Implica-
tions for an Emerging National Institution," in The Courts and the Charter, C.
Beckton and W. MacKay, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). A
more diversified court is the thrust of the reform proposals.
179 Rdaume, supra, note 133 at p. 442, citing B. Laskin, "A judge and his Constituen-
cies" (1976), 7 Man. L.J. 1 at 2.
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legal society or the individual judge.""0 The choice of what values to
balance and what sources to consult is personal. These value choices
will determine the shape of equality in Canada."'
A judge's social background has an influence on his or her
choices, and also on the role of the judge. The particular experiences
of a judge can even affect his or her view about the appropriate forum
for raising an equality issue. Laskin's experiences as a labour arbitrator
and student of the sociological school of jurisprudence may explain
his preference for resolving issues of social and economic equality out-
side the courts.S 2 Cardozo recognized these background influences but
did not decry them.
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have
been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired
convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social
needs, a sense in James' phrase of 'the total push and pressure of the cos-
mos', which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where
choice shall fall.'"
Changing the present composition of the Bench will be slow, so
reformers should focus on the education of the existing judges to meet
the new challenges of the Charter and equality. Many judges recognize
that the Charter requires not just new substantive knowledge but a
broader way of approaching issues.18 4 Chief Justice Dickson calls for
a multi-disciplinary approach in the law schools to broaden the hori-
zons of future lawyers.' 85 Throughout this article I have stressed the
opening-up of legal dialogue and the value of legal and judicial theory
for judges.
180 D. Danelski, "Values as Variables in Judicial Decision-Making" (1966), 19 Van-
derbilt L.R. 721.
181 S. Shetret, "On Assessing the Role of the Court in Society" (1980), 10 Man.
L.J. 355 and J. Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making"
(1966), 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1551.
182 R.J. Sharpe, "Bora Laskin and Civil Liberties" (1985), 35 U. of T. L.J. 632 and
H. Janisch, "Bora Laskin and administrative law: An unfinished journey"
(1985), 35 U. of T. L.J. 557.
183 Supra, note 132 at p. 12. Members of the functionalist schools of thought would
argue that reason is rarely balanced so as to restrict choice.
184 B. Wilson, "Decision-making in the Supreme Court--Goodman Lecture No.
2," an address given at the University of Toronto as part of the Goodman Lec-
ture Series, November 27, 1985.
185 B. Dickson, "Closing Dinner Speech," delivered at the Conference of Legal
Education in Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 26, 1985, pp. 9-10.
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Legal education too often destroys emotion and feeling in the
name of promoting rationality and lawyer-like thinking. While law
schools have been effective on the rational level, they have neglected
the importance of teaching values in a humanist tradition." 6 Good
legal arguments about, and judicial opinions on, equality will require
a sensitivity to the human condition as well as a rational understanding
of the law. Law schools must be engaged in moral education, and not
just law in a narrower sense. Indeed, they are engaged in moral edu-
cation by being silent on broader moral issues. Equality is an ideal
vehicle for discussions on moral issues.
6. THE SUPREME COURT TRACK RECORD ON THE
CHARTER
Space does not allow a full analysis of the early Charter cases
within the broader framework set out in this article. Such a detailed
analysis does appear in the papers of Professors Monahan and Petter. 8 7
For present purposes, I shall highlight the early trends in the Supreme
Court followed by brief comments on a few selected cases.
(a) Early Trends in Charter Cases
It may be presumptious to even talk of trends after only four
years of Charter cases, but that is what I will attempt to do. In asses-
sing the performance of the Supreme Court of Canada the cases were
considered in two groups. Those cases in which the Court spoke
broadly about its role under the Charter' received the closest atten-
186 W. MacKay, "The Social Costs of Incompetence: An Educator's View" (1982),
7 Dal. L.J. 160.
187 Supra, note 22. It should be noted, however, that the number of Supreme Court
cases on the Charter doubled from the time that the Monahan and Petter papers
were completed to the completion of this one.
188 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [19841 1 S.C.R. 357, 53 N.R. 169, 11
C.C.C. (3d) 481, 3 O.A.C. 321 (S.C.C.); Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
145, 33 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, [1984] 6 W.W.R. 577, 27 B.L.R. 297, 11 D.L.R. (4th)
641, 55 N.R. 241, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); Singh v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 12 Admin. L.R. 137, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422,
58 N.R. I (S.C.C.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, [1985] 3
W.W.R. 481, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 58 N.R. 81 (S.C.C.); Operation Dismantle v.
R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 12 Admin. L.R. 16, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 59 N.R. 1
(S.C.C.); Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.); and R. v.
Oakes (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
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tion, while a supporting cast of cases, which either followed earlier
cases or dealt with more specific rights,'8 9 received less. Comments
about the cases are organized under the themes identified and are
suggestive rather than comprehensive.
(i) The Attempt to Develop a Coherent Pattern of Cases Grounded in the
Basic Principles of a Free and Democratic Society
This attempt to create a coherent pattern of cases is most obvious
in the judgments of Chief Justice Dickson. There is less consistency
in the concurring and dissenting opinions of the other justices. In R.
v. Oakes,'90 the ChiefJustice clearly articulates that a particular Charter
issue must be examined in the context of a general commitment to
uphold rights under the Charter and in the context of the principles
of a "free and democratic society." Included in these principles are
"respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of be-
liefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of groups and
individuals in society."' 9 ' This is a pluralistic statement of values in
the classic liberal tradition but does demonstrate a sensitivity to collec-
tive as well as individual rights.
The other aspect of Oakes that is also reflected in many of the
earlier judgments of the Chief Justice is an overt attempt to link the
present case to those that have gone before. In both Oakes and Re
189 A.G. Que. v. Que. Assoc. of Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 10
D.L.R. (4th) 321, 54 N.R. 196 (S.C.C.); Plantation Indoor Plants Ltd. v. A.G.
Alta., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 366, [19851 3 W.W.R. 539, 58 N.R. 228 (S.C.C.); Staran-
chuk v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 439, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 544 (S.C.C.); R. v. Therens,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 286, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655 (S.C.C.); Trask
v. R., (1985] 1 S.C.R. 655, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 123, 59 N.R. 145 (S.C.C.); Rahn v.
R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 659, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 126, 59 N.R. 144 (S.C.C.); Dubois v.
R., 11985] 2 S.C.R. 350, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 193, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97, 48 C.R.
(3d) 193 (S.C.C.); Spencer v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278 (S.C.C.); Valente v. R.
(1985), 9 W.C.B. 350 (S.C.C.); and R. v. King, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255, 48 C.R.
(3d) 97, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 62 NR. 263 (S.C.C.).
190 Supra, note 188.
191 Ibid., p. 37. D. Klink, in "The Quest for Meaning in Charter Adjudiciation:
Comment on R. v. Therens" (1985), 31 McGill L.J. 104, argues that such broad
concepts provide little real guidance for the courts and that, as a result, the early
Charter cases lack any real coherence and direction.
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B.C. Motor Vehicle Act there is an emphasis on the "dignity and worth
of the human person" (borrowed from the preamble to the Canadian
Bill of Rights) and the "rule of law" (borrowed from the preamble to
the Charter). The attempt is to set the individual cases in the context
of the broader principles of the liberal Canadian state, which produced
the Charter. Defining these principles in more concrete form and resol-
ving disputes between competing principles will be the real test of the
Court's coherence.
(ii) The Break with the Canadian Bill of Rights in Favour of a Broader
Judicial Mandate.
Early Charter pundits made gloomy predictions about the Court
being haunted by the dismal judicial performance on the Bill of
Rights)" There is no sign of this in the early Charter cases. In R. v.
Big M Drug Mart'93 and R. v. Therens 94 the Supreme Court expressly
adopted different conclusions under the Charter than it had on the
same issues under the Bill of Rights. There is a clear statement in many
of the early cases that judicial review under the Charter is of a different
order from what had preceded it. The only notable throw-back to a
Bill of Rights analysis was the opinion of BeetzJ. in Singh v. M.E.I.,19 s
and even there the conclusion was the same as that of his majority
colleagues, who resolved the issue under the Charter. Perhaps the bold-
est break with the past is the adoption of elements of substantive due
process review in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act.
(iii) The Emergence of a Broad Reading of Individual Liberty from the Early
Charter Cases, Tempered by Some Sensitivity to Collective Rights
Many of the early judgments take an expansive approach to lib-
erty and go to great lengths to proclaim the value of liberty in Cana-
dian society. This focus is partly explained by the predominance of
cases in the criminal law context, but it also reflects a classic liberal
view of rights. Wilson J., in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, speaks of the
192 B. Hovius and R. Martin, "The Legacy of The Supreme Court of Canada's
Approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights: Prospects for the Charter" (1982), 28
McGill L.J. 32.
193 Supra, note 188.
194 Supra, note 189.
195 Supra, note 188.
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violation of liberty following an absolute liability offence as "in-
humane". The language seems excessive when one considers the many
more pressing examples of inhumanity in modem society. Liberty as
an abstract value is primarily what has motivated the Court.
One of the broadest statements on the liberty interest comes from
Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Big M Drug Mart. To his credit, he
defines it in both a negative and positive sense.
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or
constraint .... Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of com-
pulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanc-
tion, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit
alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad
sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right
to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that ... no one is to
be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.196
The Supreme Court has shown more sensitivity to collective
rights than the lower courts discussed earlier. Also in Big M Drug
Mart, Dickson C.J. indicates that Sunday observance laws are not con-
sistent with the principles of multi-culturalism proclaimed in section
27 of the Charter. The Chief Justice also makes the important point
that a "free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms."1 9 7 He emphasizes that this state-
ment does not rely on section 15 of the Charter (which was not yet in
effect), and this raises the question of whether the Sunday observance
issue could have been an equality issue. It is important to remember
that liberty and equality are not always in competition.
There is also some awareness of collective interests in Operation
Dismantle v. R. and R. v. Singh.' 9 In the latter, WilsonJ. read security
of the person broadly enough to encompass threats from outside coun-
tries. Dickson C.J. was not so disposed in Operation Dismantle or La
Forest J. in Spencer v. R.199 Furthermore, the result of the ruling in R.
v. Singh may be a sacrificing of the collective rights of those seeking
citizenship to the principle of fair hearings. The cost and time con-
sumption of such hearings may inhibit the delivery of substantive jus-
tice. Principles prevail over social facts.
196 Supra, note 188 at p. 354 (D.L.R.).
197 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 188 at p. 353 (D.L.R.).
198 Supra, note 188.
199 Supra, notes 188 and 189, respectively.
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(iv) The Charter Has Opened Up the Court to New Sources of Information,
but There Is Still a Need for More Social Facts
Lawyers more than judges can be blamed for the articulation of
Charter principles without a full social fact context. The Court has
consistently called for hard social fact evidence, especially in relation
to reasonable limits arguments under section 1 of the Charter, but such
evidence has rarely been delivered. Many cases, of which R. v. Oakes
is one notable example, have considered comparative rights in the
United States at the international level and under the European Con-
vention. These comparisons have not been used to diminish the un-
iqueness of the Canadian situation, but to provide a broader frame of
reference. Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act also liberates the Charter from the
intentions of its drafters. These intentions were considered admissible
but given little weight. Committee reports and Royal Commissions
on drugs were considered as part of the section 1 analysis in R. v.
Oakes. The Court's record is not an unblemished one, however, as
Dickson C.J., in R. v. Big M Drug Mart, seems more concerned with
the historical purposes of the Lord's Day Act than its present effects,
and Estey J. resolves the Skapinker20° case on the basis of legal head-
ings.
(v) The Adoption by the Court of a Functional Approach to the Charter,
Despite Lapses into Formalism
Since its first ruling in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker,
the Court has proclaimed a broad and purposive approach to the Char-
ter. This has been reinforced in many cases-most notably the judg-
ments of the Chief Justice in Southam, Big M Drug Mart and Oakes.
Even if the goals of the Charter are defined in rather traditional liberal
terms, the emphasis on law as a means to social justice is laudable.
There are, however, at least two notable lapses into formalism.
It is concerning that these lapses occur in the face of broader social
claims to a right to a livelihood and security in the nuclear age. Estey
J. in Skapinker not only rejected the claim that section 6 of the Charter
guaranteed a right to earn a livelihood, but also that it guaranteed
mobility within a single province. Whatever the merits of these con-
clusions, my quarrel is with the formalistic way in which they were
200 Supra, note 188.
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reached. After declaring that the Charter must be approached in an
expansive way, Estey J. relies on headings and statutory analysis to
resolve the case. This is hardly an open balancing of competing
policies.
Chief Justice Dickson, who in other cases has been quite func-
tional in his approach to the Charter, retreats into legal formalism in
his judgment in Operation Dismantle. While the viability of the state-
ment of claim cannot be ignored, there were underlying policy issues
which deserved greater play. Wilson J. does make more of an effort
to come to grips with these policy issues in her Operation Dismantle
ruling, but her analysis lacks a good philosophical base in spite of her
references to Rawls and Dworkin. It is sobering, with respect to the
Court's performance on equality, that the formalistic retreat came in
the face of the broadest collective claims. The Court is willing to be
purposive and expansive in relation to individual rights and abstract
principles, but will this approach be extended to the real problems of
equality?
(vi) Companies as Early Beneficiaries of the Charter; Extension of Similar
Rights to Private Individuals and Companies
Given the costs of taking a case to the Supreme Court of Canada,
it is not surprising that many of the early litigants outside the criminal
law cases are corporate. Whether these corporate litigants will be
given the same rights as human individuals under section 15 of the
Charter is significant. While the term "individual" in section 15 may
exclude companies, that is not free from dispute.2"' The early Court
trend in respect to other rights has been to extend rights to companies.
Petter regards this as a negative sign and sees the extension of privacy
rights to Southam Inc., in Hunter v. Southam, 202 as a conferral of prop-
erty rights. 2 3 He feels that the empirical result of giving privacy rights
to companies is not to treat them equally, but to put them in a
privileged class. I agree, but this is not a sign of a corporate bias on
201 P. Hogg, Canada Act, 1982 Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), p. 50. A con-
trary view of the application of section 15 to companies is expressed by G.D.
Chipeur, "Section 15 of the Charter Protects People and Corporations" (1986),
11 Can. Bus. L.J. 304.
202 Supra, note 188.
203 Supra, note 22 at pp. 20-25.
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the part of the Court, so much as an elevation of abstract principle
above social fact.
This same elevation can be seen in Big M Drug Mart, where, in
the name of the important principle of freedom of religion, rights are
extended to a company that is more concerned about the pursuit of
profits than matters of conscience. In real terms, the beneficiaries of
stores being open on Sunday are large companies, while the losers
include small businesses, consumers and workers.0 4 To be fair to
Chief Justice Dickson, he did support his ruling on the historical religi-
ous roots of the Lord's Day Act, rather than its present effects. Thus
he has left the door open to validating more secular laws aimed at
providing a day of rest.205 The principle may ultimately be vindicated
without producing social dislocation. This victory for large companies
may be short-lived.
(vii) The Imposition by the Court of High Standards for the Application of
Reasonable Limits in section 1 to Restrict Rights
The Court has pursued a cautious course in relation to section 1
of the Charter and avoided using it as the major vehicle for resolving
Charter disputes. This is in contrast with the pattern in the lower
courts. In A.G. Que. v. Que. Assoc. of Protestant School Boards,"6 the
court avoided the section 1 issue by drawing a formalistic line between
denials and limitations of rights. It is possible that the Court preferred
to have more cases behind it before ruling on section 1, but Monahan
suggests that the avoidance of section 1 was the result of a desire to
avoid an open balancing of competing values.2 7 This analysis is
weakened by the extensive analysis of section 1 in R. v. Oakes, which
was rendered after Monahan's draft paper.
Charter analysis is articulated as a two stage analysis in Oakes.
The first stage concerns a violation of rights and the second the reason-
able limits under section 1. This approach had been suggested in earlier
cases such as Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act. In one brief section 7 case,
204 J. Eleen, "An Open Sunday; strains workers, harms home life," Globe and Mail,
February 25, 1986.
205 This issue has already been argued in the Supreme Court, although no decision
had been reached at the time of writing. M. Strauss, "Top court to begin hearing
Sunday shopping appeals," Globe and Mail, March 3, 1986.
206 Supra, note 189.
207 Supra, note 22.
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R. v. Kng, La ForestJ. does appear to collapse the two stages into one.
That this aggravated form of robbery exposes the victim to serious injury
or death and that there has been a proliferation of such firearm-related
offences in recent years scarcely needs demonstration. Under these cir-
cumstances, the creation of such an offence does not, in my view, consti-
tute a departure from fundamental justice.218
The two stage analysis does allow for a clearer articulation of the is-
sues.
The fullest statement of the Court on section 1 appears in R. v.
Oakes, where there is a balancing of the presumption of innocence
against broader societal claims to drug enforcement. The Chief'Justice
left no doubt that the individual's right to be presumed innocent was
an important one.
It ensures that until the State proves an accused's guilt beyond all reason-
able doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society commited
to fairness and justice. The presumption of innocence confirms our faith
in humankind; it reflects our belief that individuals are decent and law-
abiding members of the community until proven otherwise. 209
This classic statement of liberalism and individual rights is fol-
lowed later in the judgment by a recognition that even such basic
rights may have to be limited if their exercise is "inimical to the reali-
zation of collective goals of fundamental importance."'21 This accep-
tance that individual rights can be trumped by social goals or policies
would be refuted by Dworkin's more abstract statement of the liberal
model of rights.2 11 Dickson C.J. in Oakes then concludes that the ob-
ject of the limitation must be pressing and substantial in a free and
democratic society, and the means to that objective, proportional, ra-
tionally linked and least restrictive of rights. This coupled with the
fact that the state has the burden of proof makes the use of section 1
difficult. 212
208 Supra, note 189 at p. 277.
209 Oakes, supra, note 188 at p. 15.
210 Ibid., p. 28.
211 Supra, note 14. Dworkin argues that policies, however important, cannot defeat
matters of principle. Dickson C.J. may be wise to avoid this policy and principle
dichotomy, which is far from clear.
212 As early as Hunter v. Southain the Court declared that the burden of proof under
section 1 is on the state.
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(viii) The Court's Insistence on a Clear Distinction Between Law and Poli-
tics, as Well as Its Recognition of a Values Component to Charter Ad-
judication.
The Court is still not ready to surrender the traditional doctrines
of supremacy of parliament in respect to the wisdom of the legislation.
Consistently, the judges have emphasized that there is a distinction
between deciding whether a government action violated the Charter
(a matter of law) and whether a government action is unwise (a matter
of politics). This proposition is most directly stated by Wilson J. in
Operation Dismantle but is also echoed by Dickson C.J. in that and
other cases. Wilson J. also espoused this position in Singh. In Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, Lamer J. juxtoposed statements about reviewing
laws on substantive principles with declarations that the courts will
not inquire into the wisdom of legislation. The line between substan-
tive evaluation under the Charter and assessing the wisdom of legisla-
tion eludes me. It appears to be a classic formalistic use of a false
dichotomy to obscure the real political choices that are being made.
While I do not accept the C.L.S. argument that judging is just
another form of politics, there is an important element of choice in
Charter adjudication that should not be obscured. Courts should not
assess the wisdom of the legislation on a purely subjective basis, but
they must assess its wisdom in relation to the standards of the Charter.
If we accept the view that there are as many versions of the constitu-
tion as there are of Hamlet, the Charter may not add much in the way
of objective criteria. 21 3 Without going that far, the Court should ac-
knowledge that the Charter does take it into the political realm of
measuring the wisdom of a law. This is the most significant low grade
on an otherwise impressive report card.
(b) Quo Vadis on Equality
The performance of the Supreme Court on the Charter to date
has surprised many and turned some Charter skeptics into true believ-
ers. Rumours that the Charter would not be a marked departure from
the anemic Canadian Bill of Rights have now been scotched. Indeed,
commentators who think that the Charter is a bad thing argue that the
Court has gone too far in changing the rules of the constitutional
213 Supra, note 129.
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game. 1 4 Far from shirking its new role, the Court has gone out of its
way, in some cases, to declare the lofty motives and principles of the
Charter.
Where will the Court go with section 15 of the Charter? I would
predict that the Court will not be as bullish on broad based equality
claims as they have been on the liberty-style rights claimed to date.
When face to face with a policy-making role in areas such as abortion,
homosexual rights and redesigning pensions and social assistance
structures, the Court will adopt a more restrained and formalistic role.
Restraint may be appropriate in some of these areas, but it would be
better if formalism were abandoned for an open balancing of the in-
terests. Petter argues that the Court will only deal with equality on a
superficial level and, in areas such as mandatory retirement, produce
regressive results." 's It is difficult to predict, because the Court has yet
to confront the really difficult cases. At the risk of losing my Charter
skeptic status, I predict that the Supreme Court will advance equality
and not impede it. The advances will be slow and small but the present
Court will rise to the challenge. At lower court levels, I am inclined
to agree with Andrew Petter that the results will be at best neutral
and possibly regressive.
7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON EQUALITY AND
JUDGING
The transcendent nature of man is reflected in the transcendent claims
made for law. As long as law wears the mantle of justice, it cannot be
locked into a computable set of rules, or predictions about judicial be-
havior.
21 6
One of the transcendent claims made for law is the creation of a
more egalitarian society. This claim must be pursued by judges who
have both the strengths and the weaknesses of their humanity. For all
our claims about logic, rationality and consistency it is an appeal to
the more emotive side ofjudges that may offer the best hope for equal-
ity. The feminists advocate a rediscovery of people's human side and
214 A. Hutchinson, "High Court Changes the Constitutional Game: Will a Judicial
Whirlwind Blow Itself Right Out?" Toronto Star, February 8, 1986, and K. Makin
"Charter Ruling Worries Legal Experts," Globe and Mail, February 24, 1986.
215 Supra, note 22 at pp. 40-43.
216 R. Samek, "Language, Communication, Computers and the Law" (1985), 9
Dal. L.J. 196 at 227.
FOR WHOM DOES THE CHARTER TOLL? 105
an end to subordination of compassion to reason. While they have no
monopoly on this view, they are on the right track. C.L.S., although
it has often been criticized for its intellectual elitism, does have leading
proponents, such as Duncan Kennedy, who elevate intuition above
scientific method. There are crucial elements of reform in radical
functionalism, but they require a significant transformation in human
nature. 217
If this transformation is to occur, it will be a slow process, and
efforts at reform should be aimed not just at judges but all segments
of society. As Jeremy Bentham observed, "law is not made by judge
alone but by judge and company."2 ' While judging is important for
the pursuit of equality, an egalitarian society must be pursued on all
fronts. If our expectations of what judges can do are more realistic,
we can diminish the illusion of rights that block real change. It may
not be fair to expect more compassion from judges than from the rest
of society. What we can hope for is a rational articulation of the com-
peting values. To say this does not mean we should expect that the
reasons given will be logically conclusive--that would be going to the
other extreme of formalism and objectivism. Between the extremes
of complete arbitrariness and naive objectivism there are better and
worse arguments-there are degrees of thoroughness and cogency. We
want good, well thought out, clearly reasoned argument-it will of
course be value laden; it all is. We just want a clear articulation of the
courts' reasons for why the values chosen should prevail. Judicial argu-
ment can be persuasive, without being logically conclusive.
As lawyers we can advocate creative approaches to the Charter
that will promote real equality, and prevent the courts from blocking
progressive initiatives from the other organs of the state. In this effort
the Charter is an important new tool, which can be used for good or
evil. It will be put to both uses but we can all attempt to create a
better legal system, in which equality will be the norm rather than
the exception. Lawyers must walk the fine line between progressive
Charter arguments and the raising of false hopes. We must all be radical
in our own way-some within the liberal structure and some without
it. The bell tolls for us all.
217 P.E. Johnson, "Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical" (1984), 36 Stanford L.R.
247. This is a significant aspect of a general critique of the C.L.S. movement.
While I do not accept Johnson's rather pessimistic view of human nature, I do
agree that a transformation of peoples' views and beliefs is unlikely.
218 J. Bentham, as quoted in H.E. Dean, Judicial Review and Democracy (New York:
Random House, 1966), p. 72. Dean does not footnote the quotation.

